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Overcoming the Unfortunate Legacy of Haditha,
The Stryker Brigade "Kill Team," and Pantano:
Establishing More Effective War Crimes
Accountability by the United States
Alan F Williams,
"To extend freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, we must remain true
to the Law of War, to include our international law obligations."'
"The possibility that warriors can be disciplined and restrained
distinguish[] them from mere murderers."3
INTRODUCTION
U S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Ilario Pantano led his infantry platoon
on patrol in Iraq near the flashpoint city of Fallujah on April 15, 2004,
when they headed to investigate a suspected insurgent compound in
the town of Mahmudiyah. 4 As the platoon approached, the marines saw
a vehicle occupied by two civilian Iraqi men begin to depart from the
compound.5 After Pantano ordered his platoon to stop the vehicle and
detain the two men, his marines complied and handcuffed them.6 Shortly
I Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law (2006-2012). Professor
Williams passed away after this article was submitted and accepted. The Kentucky Law Journal
board of editors completed final editing. Professor Williams was a retired Marine Corps judge
advocate who served as a military judge, prosecutor, defense counsel and Special Assistant
U.S. Attorney while on active duty. Prior to becoming a lawyer, Professor Williams served more
than ten years in the U.S. intelligence community including a stint as a Marine Corps company
commander and more than four years with the National Security Agency. The author wished
to thank Brandon Berrett and Jonathan Sawmiller for their superlative efforts in support of
the writing of this article.
2 J.N. Mattis, Foreword to U.S. MARINE CORPS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, MARINE CORPS
REFERENCE PUBLICATION 4-I i.8B, WAR CRIMES, i (Sept. 6, 2005), available at http://www.fas.
org/irp/doddir/usmc/mcrp4-i i-8b.pdf.
3 DAVID LUBAN, ET AL, INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1038 (2010).
4 Steve Fishman, Hell's Kitchen, N.Y. MAG., 5 (May 2 1, 2005), http://nymag.com/nymetro
news/people/features/i 1774/. The author filed a FOIA request to obtain the original Article 32
report, which was initially denied. An appeal was then lodged, which resulted in the request
being granted. However, nearly a year has passed since the appeal was granted, but the Naval
Criminal Investigative Service has yet to provide the report.
5 Id. at 1, 6.
6 Id. at 6.
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thereafter, members of the platoon conducted a thorough search of the
vehicle and found no weapons.' Meanwhile, the platoon searched the
compound and found three AK-47 rifles, ten AK-47 magazines, and what
were later generically described as materials used in making improvised
explosive devises (IEDs). Upon learning that his marines had discovered
weapons possibly belonging to insurgents, Pantano isolated himself, two
members of his platoon, and the two Iraqi civilians away from the rest
of the marines.' Pantano ordered the two platoon members to look away
from the vehicle after removing the handcuffs from the two Iraqis and
ordered the Iraqis back to their vehicle to search it again.1" While the two
platoon members were looking away, Pantano suddenly opened fire on the
Iraqis with his M16A4 assault rifle.11 After firing thirty rounds into the two
Iraqis, he removed the empty magazine and inserted another thirty round
magazine into his rifle and continued firing until it was empty."2 Pantano
then fashioned a placard which he placed near the bodies that read: "No
better friend, no worse enemy." 13
Several weeks after the incident, one of the two platoon members
who were ordered to face away during the killings reported the incident
to authorities, prompting the initiation of an investigation by the Naval
Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).14
The investigation amassed evidence from a wide variety of sources that
clearly indicated that the killings by Pantano were not justified. Based on the
NCIS investigation, Pantano was charged with two counts of premeditated
murder and desecration of bodies.15 Pantano's commanding officer referred
the case to an Article 32 investigation.16 In the military justice system an
"Article 32" is a hearing, roughly analogous to the preliminary hearing used
in many state jurisdictions, to determine whether there is probable cause
to initiate a criminal prosecution.17 In order to justify the filing of formal
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. The two platoon members were Sgt. Daniel Coburn and Navy Corpsman George
Gobles (a member of medical personnel assigned to the platoon). Id. at I.
1o Id. at 6.
I IId. at I.
12 Id. Later, during an interview with New York Magazine Pantano stated: "I believed
that by firing the number of rounds that I did, I was sending a message." Id. at 6.
13 Id. "No better friend, no worse enemy" was a slogan popularized in the Marine Corps
by Pantano's commanding general, Lt. General James Mattis. It is generally ascribed to the
Roman dictator Sulla who used it as his personal epitaph.
14 Rowan Scarborough, Witness Says Accused Marine Ordered Iraqis to Stop, WASH. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 2005, atAI.
15 John DeSantis, Marine Accused of Murder in Iraqis' Deaths is Cleared, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 2005, at A18.
16 Id.
17 See 1o U.S.C. § 832 (zoo6); see also MANUAL FOR COURs-MArIAL, UNITED STATES,
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charges, the prosecution only needed to establish "reasonable grounds" to
believe that Pantano committed the offenses charged."8 This reasonable
grounds standard is equivalent to probable cause in civilian jurisdictions
and is the lowest possible burden of proof for the government in any
criminal proceeding.
At the Article 32 hearing, the prosecution produced evidence that
Pantano violated the Geneva Conventions by committing what is known
as a "grave breach"-a serious violation of the law of war-by willfully
killing the two unarmed Iraqi civilians.' 9 Pantano claimed that just prior to
firing sixty rounds into the men, they were talking to each other and moved
toward him, which prompted him to open fire because he feared for his
life."° Notwithstanding Pantano's highly improbable claim of self-defense,
the military prosecutors presented compelling evidence that the killing
of these two unarmed Iraqi civilians was nothing short of premeditated
murder, not subject to any mitigation or justification."'
Given that the burden of proof in an Article 32 investigation to establish
a basis for proceeding with a full criminal prosecution is so low, there was
little doubt after the hearing that Pantano should face a general court-
martial for the killing and desecration of the bodies of the two unarmed
Iraqi civilians."2 However, despite the strong evidence produced at the
Article 32 investigation, the investigating officer (10) recommended that
Pantano should face only non-judicial punishment (NJP) under Article 15
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for firing the high number
of rounds into the bodies and leaving the placard, but recommended no
action be taken concerning the deaths of the two unarmed Iraqis.13 At an
Article 15 NJP hearing, normally conducted by the commanding general in
the case of officers, Pantano would face only reprimand, arrest in quarters
for not more than thirty days, restriction to limits for not more than sixty
days, and forfeiture of not more than one-half month's pay per month for
R.C.M. 405 (2008) [hereinafter MCM].
18 MCM, supra note 17, at R.C.M. 405(j)(2)(H).
19 Grave breaches.., shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed
against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture
or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve
in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.
Geneva Convention, art. 13o, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316.
2o Fishman, supra note 4, at 6.
21 Id.
22 A general court-martial is the highest-level court-martial by the military, roughly
analogous to a felony criminal court. A general court-martial may impose any permissible
sentence under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, up to and including death. See MCM,
supra note 17, at R.C.M. 1003.
23 DeSantis, supra note 15; 1 o U.S.C. § 815 (2oo6). See also WallStreetMarine to be Cleared?,
ABC NEWS (May 16, 2005), http://abcnews.go.com/US/LegalCenter/story?id=76o785&page=2.
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two months.2 4 Any sanction imposed would not be considered a conviction
under federal law but simply an administrative proceeding."5 By contrast,
if charges were referred to a general court-martial for disposition, Pantano
would potentially face the death penalty or life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dismissal
from the service.1
6
Since an Article 32 10's recommendation is only advisory and does
not bind the general court-martial convening authority, the commanding
general of the 2nd Marine Division, General Richard Huck, still had the
option of referring the case to a general court-martial notwithstanding
the 10's recommendation.2 7 On May 26, 2005, General Huck dismissed
all charges against Pantano and elected not to proceed with any punitive
proceedings of any kind against him-not even non-judicial punishment.
28
Shortly after this announcement, Pantano was allowed to resign
from the service and received an honorable discharge from the Marine
Corps. 9 He went on to write a self-congratulatory memoir detailing his
actions in Iraq entitled Warlord: No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy,30 and
received significant media exposure on such venues as The Daily Show and
Hannity while promoting his book.31 In 2010, Pantano won the Republican
nomination for a U.S. Congressional seat for the Seventh Congressional
District of North Carolina, but he ultimately lost in the General Election
to the Democratic incumbent.32 In 2012, Pantano revived his campaign for
24 IOU.S.C.§815.
25 See MCM, supra note 17, Part V(i)(g).
26 1o U.S.C. §§ 855-858B, 918 (2oo6). Moreover, the conviction would be considered a
felony by most jurisdictions.
27 MCM, supra note 17, at R.C.M 4o6-407; see also o U.S.C. §§ 833-835 (2oo6).
28 DeSantis, supra note 15. As will be discussed later in this article, General Huck also
played a major role in the alleged cover up and handling of the Haditha massacre, an event
that greatly jeopardized the future of U.S.-Iraq relations and led to a minimization of the U.S.
presence in Iraq.
29 llario Pantano Announces His Candiday for Congress in North Carolina's Seventh
Distict, ST. PAULS REV. (Feb. 4, 2010, 11:11 AM), http://www.stpaulsreview.com/view/full-
story/5774712/article-Ilario-Pantano-announces-his-candidacy-for-congress-in-North-
Carolina%E z%8o%99s-seventh-district.
30 The book was re-released in late 2011 under the new title WARLORD: BROKEN BY WAR,
SAVED BY GRACE. ILARIO PANTANO & MALCOLM MCCONNELL, WARLORD: BROKEN BY WAR, SAVED
BY GRACE (201 I).
31 A clip of Pantano's Hannity appearance can be found on his website and on YouTube.
See Hannity (FOX television broadcast Sept. 13, 2010), available at http://www.youtube.com/
watch?feature=playerembedded&v=df7JDle4K24. A clip of Pantano's appearance on The
Daily Show can be found on the show's website. The Daily Show (Comedy Central television
broadcast July 10, 2oo6), available at http:l/www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mon-july-io-2oo6/
ilario-pantano.
32 Official Results, N. C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/
NC/15 7o5 /29 325/en/vts.html?cid=z 1007000 (last updated June 24, zo1o) (Republican Primary
[Vol. IOI
WAR CRIMES ACCOUNTABILITY
the House and once again sought the Republican nomination for North
Carolina's Seventh Congressional District,3 3 but this time he lost in the
primary election.
34
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have taken a tremendous toll on
American service members who have made incredible sacrifices on behalf
of their country. Unfortunately, the type of conduct for which Pantano has
thus far escaped criminal liability has been all too common over the past
ten years. The handling 6f the Pantano case is a prime example of the blind
eye that the U.S. military has often cast upon its own war crimes cases. In
dozens of instances military authorities have either dismissed charges or
given light punishment for acts of U.S. personnel that appear to be serious
violations of the law of war or grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.3"
In this article, I will argue that the current U.S approach to handling war
crimes in the age of terrorism is fundamentally flawed and has repeatedly
produced unjust outcomes, particularly in a series of high profile cases
that have greatly damaged the position of the U.S. in the international
community. By failing to hold U.S. service members properly accountable
for their atrocities, the U.S. has lost the respect of the international
community and greatly increased the likelihood that U.S. personnel who
serve in conflicts in the future will be subjected to severe mistreatment at
the hands of our enemies.
This article will proceed in three parts. Part I describes the current
international war crimes regime and explains how the U.S. meets its treaty
obligations under the Geneva Conventions through the Uniform Code
of Military Justice and the War Crimes Act of 1996. Part II identifies and
analyzes the most serious issues of war crimes accountability currently
facing the U.S. Finally, Part III offers recommendations for addressing these
problems, including the creation of a War Crimes Review Commission, and
also address likely objections to my proposals.
results); Official Results, N. C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/
NC/22 5 8o/4 168 7/en/vts.html?cid=2007000 (last-updated Dec. 20, 2010) (General Election
results).
33 Who is llaio Pantano?, PANTANO FOR CONGRESS, http://pantanoforcongress.com/about/
who-is-ilario-pantano (last visited Nov. 3, zoiz).
34 Official Results, N. C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/
NC/ 36596/85942/en/summary.html (last updated June 13,2012) (Republican Primary results).
35 See infra Appendix i.
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I. CURRENT WAR CRIMES REGIME AND THE UNITED STATES' IMPLEMENTATION
A. Overview of the International War Crimes Regime and
U.S. Domestic Implementation
All civilized nations are subject to a set of rules for the conduct of
warfare. There are two main bodies of law relating to war: jus ad bellum
andjus in bello. The first of these, jus adbellum, is a Latin phrase meaning
"the right to wage war" and is a body of international law that seeks to
determine under what conditions a nation may lawfully resort to war.36
This article will not address this area of the law, but will instead focus on
jus in bello, another Latin phrase that translates roughly to "the law of the
battlefield."'" There are currently three different formulations used to
describe the law of the battlefield: the Law of War (LOW), International
Humanitarian Law (IHL), and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). 3 8
Although the term "Law of War" is the oldest and probably the most
simple and straightforward way of describing the legal regime ofjus in bello,
this term appears to have fallen into disfavor. In these enlightened times,
nations rarely fight "wars" anymore. They do, however, get involved in
"conflicts" quite often. Some observers, like British General Rupert Smith,
have gone so far as to declare, "War no longer exists.... [Wiar as battle in
a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a
dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists."39 Therefore, the
more modern terms IHL and LOAC are used much more often today when
commentators discussjus in bello. The term LOAC seems to be preferred
by military practitioners while IHL is preferred by academics writing in
this field. 4° For simplicity in this article, I will use the term IHL to refer to
jus in bello, as it seems to be fitting of the wide range of situations to which
this body of law applies and is in keeping with the evolving convention.
The modern conception of IHL is based upon three main sets of
international treaties-the 1907 Hague Convention IV, the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, and the 1977 Additional Protocols I and 11.41 The 1907
36 GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN
WAR 22 (zoO).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 26. Confusingly, there is also International Human Rights Law which deals with
the enforcement of international human rights conventions and is considered a discrete body
of law apart from IHL/LOAC by most authorities. See id. at 24-26.
39 RUPERT SMITH, THrE UTILITY OF FORCE: THE ART OF WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 3
(Knopf 2007).
40 SoLIS, supra note 36, at 23.
41 Id. at 149. The terms "convention" and "protocol" are simply alternative ways of
referring to treaties. See Treaties and Customary Law: Overview, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS
(Oct. 29, 20io), http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/overview-
treaties-and-customary-law.htm.
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Hague Conventions are limited in that they deal mainly with the means
and methods of the conduct of warfare, e.g., what type of weapons may be
used.4" The 1949 Conventions are wider ranging and deal with a vast array
of issues ranging from the treatment of the sick, wounded, and prisoners of
war on the battlefield to specific regulations such as prisoner entitlements to
living space, recreation, and personal comfort supplies.43 More than twenty
years after the Geneva Conventions were signed, a series of conferences
in Geneva sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) were held from 1971 to 1977 and culminated in the creation of
Protocols I and II Additional."
In addition to the involvement of the traditional western powers,
the ICRC also invited certain national liberation movements to fully
participate in these discussions. 45 Even though these movements did not
have a formal vote, their positions heavily influenced states sympathetic
to their goals and led to the inclusion of provisions that were opposed
by the traditional western powersY6 As a result, while every nation in the
world is a party to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, not all have adopted
Additional Protocols I and 11. 41 The U.S. remains one of the countries that
have not ratified Protocols I and 11,48 but it has acknowledged that many
of the provisions of these Protocols have attained the status of customary
international law by virtue of the principle of opiniojuris.49
The major impact of these conventions on the common soldier is
that they outline the limits of lawful battlefield conduct and define an
important list of violations called "grave breaches" that merit special
attention by nations who are party to the Conventions. By ratifying the
Geneva Conventions, the U.S. committed itself to searching out, and
42 See generally Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. TS. 277.
43 See generally Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3 114, 75 U.N.TS. 3i; see also
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.TS. 135.
44 Sous, supra note 36, at 120.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Currently, 172 states are a party to Additional Protocol I and I66 states are a party to
Additional Protocol II. State Parties to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other
Related Treaties as of27-Sep-2oI2, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 6 (Sep. 27, 2012), http://
www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/partymain_treaties/$File/IHL and otherrelatedTreaties.
pdf.
48 See id.
49 See SoLIs, supra note 36, at 134-35. Opiniojuris occurs when a state believes that
international law (rather than a moral obligation) mandates it to act in a certain way, and that
way is believed to be the customary practice. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (9th ed. 2009).
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either prosecuting or extraditing, those who commit "grave breaches." 0
"Grave breaches" include willful killing, torture, or inhumane treatment,
biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious bodily
injury or health, taking of hostages, unjustified and extensive destruction
of property, compelling a prisoner of war (POW) to serve in the armed
forces of his enemy, and willfully depriving a POW of his rights to a fair
and regular trial."'
States ratifying the treaties were bound under the Conventions to
"enact legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for
persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave
breaches."5" Therefore, after ratification it was incumbent upon each state
party to effectively implement the war crime prosecution provisions of the
Conventions through the mechanisms of its domestic law, a situation that
led to varying approaches to implementation.
After ratification, the U.S. could have enacted a specific criminal statute
in the U.S. Code to proscribe the grave breaches and articulate punishments
for the violations of the law of war. However, the U.S. did not pursue this
path. The signing of the Geneva Conventions coincided with the adoption
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), a comprehensive criminal
code that applies to each branch of the armed services as well as to the
Coast Guard. The UCMJ was passed by Congress in 1950 and became
effective on May 31, 1951, less than two years after the U.S. signed the
Geneva Conventions in 1949.53 When the Conventions were ratified by the
U.S. in 1955, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee determined that
existing federal law-the newly-minted UCMJ-provided a sufficient
legal framework to achieve compliance with obligation to prosecute war
crimes under the Conventions.54 Therefore, no additional legislation
was passed. This approach by the U.S. was consistent with that of most
50 See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3114, 75 U.N.TS.
3 1. See also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3217, 75
U.N.TS. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, art. 146, Aug. I, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3516, 75 U.N.TS. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.TS. 135.
51 E.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3114, 75 U.N.TS.
3 l. See also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 35 16, 75 U.N.TS. 287; Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 13o, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.TS. 135.
52 See sources cited supra note 50.
53 See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice, 1o U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2oo6).
54 See H.R. REP. No. 1o4-698, at 3-4 (1996) (quoting SEN. EXEc. Doc. No. 84-9, at 27
(1955)).
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high contracting parties: compliance with the common Articles' domestic
legislation requirement through their own military justice systems was the
norm rather than the exception.
55
During the period from 1955 to 1996 the UCMJ was the sole source of
U.S. domestic law for carrying out the mandates of the Geneva Conventions.
In 1996, Representative Walter Jones of North Carolina introduced a bill
that eventually became the War Crimes Act of 1996.56 His purpose in
introducing the bill was to "give the United States the legal authority to try
and prosecute the perpetrators of war crimes against American citizens.""
The version of the Act that eventually passed by overwhelming majorities
in Congress included three main provisions: it criminalized only "grave
breaches" of the Geneva Conventions, applied to conduct both inside
and outside the United States, and applied when either the victim or the
perpetrator was a member of the Armed Forces or a U.S. national.
5" The
original version also specified life imprisonment or death as penalties if
death resulted to the victim.5 9
Since its original enactment the War Crimes Act has been amended
twice. The first time was one year after passage in 1997, when the language
was changed from criminalizing only grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions to covering the much broader category of "war crimes."
60
The Act also defined what could be considered war crimes. As a result, the
Act covered not only the very limited category of "grave breaches," but
also criminalized violations of the 1907 Hague Convention IV, violations
of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as well as willful
killing or serious injury to civilians in violation of the 1996 Protocol on
Landmines (to be triggered by the U.S. ratifying this Convention).
61
The most recent amendment came in the wake of the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.62 In Hamdan the Court declared
that common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to the conflict
with al-Qaeda. 63 Common Article 3 prohibits protected persons from being
subjected to violence, outrages upon personal dignity, torture, and cruel,
humiliating, or degrading treatment.64 The Bush administration had long
55 SOuIs, supra note 36, at 86.
56 War Crimes Act of 1996, H.R. 3680, io4th Cong. (1996) (enacted).
57 142 CONG. REC. 19,563 (1996) (statement of Rep. Walter Jones).
58 H.R. 3680 § 2401 (enacted).
59 Id.
60 H.R. 2159, 1o5 th Cong. § 583 (1997).
61 Id.
62 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. S57 (2006).
63 Id. at 631-32.
64 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.TS. 31; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
20][2-20131
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asserted that Article 3 did not apply to this conflict because "the conflict
with al Qaeda, being 'international in scope,' does not qualify as a 'conflict
not of an international character."' 65 In addition, the Bush administration
had authorized the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques" that many
had declared were actually torture.'
The decision in Hamdan now posed questions about the criminal liability
of U.S. military or intelligence personnel who had engaged in "enhanced
interrogation techniques." Since the Court declared that common Article 3
applied to the conflict with al-Qaeda, some worried that those agents who
used waterboarding and other "enhanced interrogation techniques" might
now be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2441 for war crimes. To prevent such
prosecutions from occurring, Congress moved quickly to amend the statute.
As amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, the War Crimes
Act now criminalizes only specified common Article 3 violations labeled
as "grave breaches."67 Before these amendments, any violation of common
Article 3 constituted a criminal offense. As of the date of this article, more
than fifteen years have elapsed since passage of the War Crimes Act, but
there has yet to be a single prosecution under this statute. I will explore the
possible reasons for this later in this article.
In addition to the Geneva Convention regime, the Rome Statute
established the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002 as a permanent
international tribunal to address war crimes, genocide, crimes against
humanity, and crimes of aggression.68 The statute has been ratified by 119
countries that are now party to its jurisdiction.69 Although the U.S. signed
the Rome Statute initially, it subsequently backed away from the ICC and
has now "unsigned" the treaty, thereby refusing to subject its nationals to
ICC jurisdiction.7" While the Bush Administration took a hard-line stance
against ICC membership, the Obama administration has recently begun
Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 US.T. 3217, 75 U.N.TS. 85; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T 3 5 I6, 75 U.N.TS. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 33 16, 75 U.N.TS. 135.
65 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630.
66 See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President 46 (Aug. 1, zooz), available at http://fl i.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/doj/
bybee8olo2mem.pdf.
67 Military Commissions Act of 2oo6, Pub. L. No. 1o9-366, § 6(b), 120 Stat. 26oo, 2633
(zoo6) (amending i8 U.S.C. § 2441 (2oo6)).
68 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.TS.
3, 37 I.L.M. 999, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA 9 AEFF 7- 5 7 5 2-4 F84 -
BE94-oA65 5 EB 3 oE 16/o/Rome-StatuteEnglish.pdf.
69 Fact Sheet, COALITION FOR THE INT'L CRIM. CT. (Nov. 10, 201 l), http://www.iccnow.org/
documents/signatory-chart NovO i20 IEN.pdf.
70 JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31495, U.S. POLICY REGARDING THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 2 (2oo6), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RL314 95 .pdf.
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a process of re-engagement with the ICC.71 However, there is substantial
objection to U.S. membership in the ICC and the Rome Statute is unlikely
to be ratified by the U.S. in the near future.7"
B. How War Crimes are Investigated and Prosecuted by the U.S. Military
Although no war crimes or grave breaches are enumerated in the UCMJ,
Article 18 does provide that "[g]eneral courts-martial also have jurisdiction
to try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military
tribunal and may adjudge any punishment permitted by the law of war."73
Criminal offenses, including those which may be considered violations of
the laws of war, are set forth in Articles 77 through 134 of the UCMJ.
74
These are the so-called "punitive articles" which proscribe a wide variety
of crimes, both uniquely military offenses as well as others that are very
akin to their common and civil cousins. Examples of uniquely military
offenses include absence without leave under Article 8675 and disrespect
toward superior commissioned officer under Article 89.76 Examples of
traditional common law crimes that have been imported into the UCMJ
71 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRANSCRIPT OF SPECIAL BRIEFING ON "U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE OUTCOME OF THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED
REVIEW CONFERENCE" (June 15, 2oio), available at http://geneva.usmission.gov/20o/06/15/
u-s-engagement-with-the-icc/.
72 Id.
73 1o U.S.C. § 818 (2006).
74 io U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (2006).
75 1o U.S.C. § 886 (2oo6). This provision states:
Any member of the armed forces who, without authority- (i) fails to go to his
appointed place of duty at the time prescribed; (2) goes from that place; or (3)
absents himself or remains absent from his unit, organization, or place of duty at
which he is required to be at the time prescribed; shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct.
Id.
76 io U.S.C. § 889 (2006).
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include murder under Article 118, 77 robbery under Article 122,78 and rape
under Article 120.
79
Because no specific war crimes are enumerated under the UCMJ,
the practice that evolved after U.S. ratification of the Conventions is to
charge the individual with the enumerated punitive article that is most
analogous to the war crime that is alleged to have been committed."0 Thus,
service members like Pantano who are accused of willful killing, a grave
breach under the Conventions, are charged with murder under Article
118. However, there is an inherent weakness in this system. Because no
separate set of specific war crimes are enumerated in the UCMJ, typically
no distinction is made between a willful killing in violation of the Geneva
Conventions and the murder of a fellow soldier in the barracks for charging
purposes-both crimes will be charged under the same article, even though
the former is a war crime while the latter is not.
Article 134 of the UCMJ allows military prosecutors to assimilate other
federal statutes, or even create charges that are, neither crimes under the
UCMJ nor federal law, so long as the crimes are non-capital."' Although
it is possible for military prosecutors to draft "novel specifications" under
Article 134 to accurately tailor the charges to the actual circumstances of a
war crime instead of charging the generic analogous offense, this practice
has not been adopted by the military.
In general, war crimes prosecutions are handled like any other of
the thousands of criminal prosecutions by the military every year. After
an investigation by the services' criminal investigative agencies (such as
77 i0 U.S.C. § 918 (2oo6). This provision states:
Any person subject to this chapter who, without justification or excuse, unlawfully
kills a human being, when he- (i) has a premeditated design to kill; (2) intends to
kill or inflict great bodily harm; (3) is engaged in an act that is inherently dangerous
to another and evinces a wanton disregard of human life; or (4) is engaged in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary, sodomy, rape, robbery, or
aggravated arson; is guilty of murder, and shall suffer such punishment as a court-
martial may direct, except that if found guilty under clause (i) or (4), he shall suffer
death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct.
Id.
78 1o U.S.C. § 922 (2oo6). This provision states:
Any person subject to this chapter who with intent to steal takes anything of value
from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of force
or violence or fear of immediate or future injury to his person or property or to
the person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his
company at the time of the robbery, is guilty of robbery and shall be punished as
a court-martial may direct.
Id.
79 IO U.S.C. § 920 (2oo6).
80 See Mynda G. Ohman, Integrating Title t8 War Crimes into Title io: A Proposal to Amend
the Uniform Code of Afilitary Justice, 57 A.F L. REV. 1, 37, 39 (2005).
81 10 U.S.C. § 934 (zoo6). Under Article 134, novel specifications may be drafted for
"all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces,
all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not
capital." Id.
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NCIS, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, or Air Force Office of
Special Investigations), an Article 32 investigation is undertaken."2 If the
convening authority determines that reasonable grounds exist that the
offense charged was committed, it refers the charges to a general court-
martial.8 3The court-martial is composed of officers or enlisted men selected
by the commander and functions much like a juryYO The accused is entitled
to appointed military defense counsel regardless of their financial situation
and, if convicted, has the right to appeal, potentially all the way up to the
U.S. Supreme Court. 5
C. How War Crimes Prosecutions Are Conducted by the Department of Justice
The Department of Justice (DOJ) is the sole agency outside of the
U.S. military responsible for the investigation and prosecution of war
crimes committed by Americans. 6 Under the cognizance of the DOJ, the
US Attorneys' Offices (USAOs) are the principal prosecutors of violations
of federal law, 7 such as the War Crimes Act. While a USAO typically
prosecutes a federal criminal case, the DOJ has set up various agencies
that specialize in areas of substantive federal law, which help develop,
enforce, and supervise the application of federal laws related to those areas
of specialty.8 The DOJ agency that is responsible for actions involving
the War Crimes Act is the Human Rights and Special Prosecution Section
(HRSP), which is a part of the DOJ Criminal Division. 9
82 See io U.S.C. § 832 (2oo6). Seealso MCM,supra note 17, at R.C.M. 405(a).
83 MCM, supra note 17, at R.C.M. 405(j).
84 See id. at R.C.M. 503.
85 See 1o U.S.C. §§ 827, 866-867a.
86 Compare Human Rights and Special Prosecution Section, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/hrsp (last visited Dec. 30, 2012) (explaining that the Department
of Justice investigates and prosecutes war crimes through the HRSP), with The Human Rights
Violators and War Crimes'Unit, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/
human-rights-violators/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2o12) (explaining that the Department of
Homeland Security investigates to prevent the US from becoming a safe haven for foreign
war crimes suspects), and Office of Global Criminal Justice, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE., http://www.
state.gov/j/gcj/index.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2012) (explaining that the Department of State
advises the U.S. government and foreign governments on issues related to war crimes). See also
ELSEA, supra note 70, at 1, 4 (explaining that the US is not a party to the ICC and thus does
not have jurisdiction over Americans charged with war crimes).
87 28 U.S.C. § 547(I) (2oo6); United States Attorneys' Mission Statement, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/usao/about/mission.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2012).
88 See generally Department of Justice Agencies, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (May 2, 201 z), http://
www.justice.gov/agencies/index-org.html (depicting the numerous DOJ agencies).
89 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-4.129 (1997)
[hereinafter USAM], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading-room/usaml
title9/4mcrm.htm#9-4.129 ("[Clonsultation with HRSP/CTS is required before instituting
any criminal process under ... war crimes."); About the Human Rights and Special Prosecution
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The DOJ summarizes the mission of the HRSP as "Ensuring
Accountability for Human Rights Violations and Extraterritorial Violent
Crime."9 Specifically, "[w]here U.S. federal jurisdiction exists, HRSP seeks
to prosecute human rights violators under the federal criminal statutes
proscribing torture, war crimes, genocide, and recruitment or use of child
soldiers."' Additionally, the HRSP prosecutes cases involving "crimes of
violence committed abroad, particularly crimes that fall under MEJA,"9
by coordinating and participating in "investigations and prosecutions
of individuals employed by or supporting United States military forces
overseas who commit murder, sex crimes, and other federal felony
offenses."93 It was the Department of Domestic Security (DDS), one of
the DOJ sections that were merged to create the HRSP, that was involved
in investigating the fatal 2006 shooting of an Iraqi guard by a contractor for
Blackwater.94
Generally, war crimes prosecutions by a USAO would be pursued
in similar manner to the thousands of other federal criminal cases
prosecuted each year. However, "[m]atters involving .. .war crimes (18
U.S.C. § 2441) ... raise issues of national and international concern.
Successful prosecution of these matters requires both careful coordination
within the [DOJI and careful coordination between the Department
and senior officials in the foreign affairs and military communities."9
Therefore, when a USAO opens any war crimes matter, it is required to
notify the HRSP and provide an overview of the investigation, preferably
Section, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/hrsp/about/ (last visited Dec.
30, 2012). The HRSP was created in 20o by combining the Office of Special Investigations
(which investigated Nazi/WW II-area acts and later U.S. citizens who participated abroad in
genocide, torture, or extrajudicial killing) and the Domestic Security Section (which prosecuted
international human rights violations, crimes brought under MEJA, and immigration and
border crimes). Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer
Announces New Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section in Criminal Division (Mar.
30, 20o), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/zoio/March/io--crm-347.html.
90 About the Human Rights and Special Prosecution Section, supra note 89.
9 Id.
92 Id. MEJA is the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, which establishes federal
jurisdiction over offenses committed outside the U.S. by persons employed or accompanying
the Armed Forces. See 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2oo6).
93 About the Human Rights and Special Prosecution Section, supra note 89. "Similarly, HRSP
investigates and prosecutes cases involving violent crimes that fall under the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Id.
94 DOJ Team Investigates 2oo6 Blackwater Shooting in Green Zone, KCBY (May 15, 2008),
http://www.kcby.com/news/national/18994i04.html.
95 USAM, supra note 89, at § 9-2. 139(A) (20o0). The Criminal Division, and specifically
the HRSP, is the DOJ unit responsible for this coordination. Id. However, if the war crime
also involves international terrorism then the coordination is assigned to the Counterterrorism
Section of the National Security Division. Id.
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in advance of any action. 96 Further, if a USAO is aware that another USAO
or the HRSP has already opened a related matter, it must consult with that
entity before issuing grand jury subpoenas or applying for a pen register or
trap and trace order that might affect the related matter.97
The USAO collaboration with the DOJ continues throughout the entire
investigation and prosecution of a war crime. Specifically, the USAO must
notify the HRSP of significant developments such as filing of warrants,
surveillance, declining to file charges, dismissal of charges, plea agreements,
results of trials, sentencing, and appeals.98 USAOs are also encouraged
to consult with the HRSP on investigative tactics, discovery, and use of
witnesses.99 The sharing of information between the agencies is a two-way
street, which requires that the HRSP share any information it receives that
is relevant to a war crimes matter pending in a USAO. 100
In addition to required consultation with HRSP regarding the
development of war crimes prosecutions, "[pirior, express approval of the
Assistant Attorney General (AAG) of the Criminal Division (or his or her
designee) is required for [filing most court documents in a] war crimes ...
matter."' 0' This prior approval is sought by first going to the HRSP, which
normally requires copies of all proposed documents as well as a prosecution
memorandum.' Additionally, "[a]ttorneys are encouraged to seek informal
guidance from HRSP throughout the investigation and well before a final
indictment and prosecution memorandum are submitted for review" and
are also required to allow the HRSP and the AAG sufficient time to permit
review, revision, and discussion of the matter.03
II. CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH How THE UNITED STATES ADDRESSES WAR
CRIMES AND THE CAUSES OF THESE PROBLEMS
Much of the progress achieved in IHL through the Hague and Geneva
Conventions is in jeopardy of becoming another casualty in the so-called
War on Terror.The record of the U.S. in adhering to aspirations of the Geneva
96 Id. at § 9-2.139(C).
97 Id. at § 9-2.139(D).
98 Id.
99 Id.
I oo Id.
IoI Id. at 9-2.139(E) (emphasis omitted).
102 Id. "HRSP may waive this requirement in a particular case," but the USAM
emphasizes that "[a] well-written, carefully organized prosecution memorandum is the
greatest guarantee that a prosecution will be authorized quickly and efficiently." Id.
103 Id. However, the USAM does provide that in the case of exigent circumstances that
the USAO may take immediate action, but "must promptly notify HRSP of any action taken
and of the exigent circumstances that precluded obtaining prior approval." Id. at 9-2.139(G)
(emphasis omitted). After that notification the AAG will confer with the USAO on the course
of action to be taken. Id.
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Conventions for war crimes accountability since 9/11 is not impressive.' 4 In
addition to situations like that of Pantano, where individuals go completely
unpunished, many others have been charged and convicted of what might
be viewed as relatively minor crimes (e.g., dereliction of duty, simple assault,
making false statements) in spite of the serious nature of the underlying
conduct. 0 Furthermore, a significant number of service members have
been acquitted of all charges, or had the charges dismissed before trial.'
0 6
While there have undoubtedly been cases where service members were
wrongfully accused, it is surprising how many accusations have failed to
result in any type of conviction. Some of these failings are likely due to lack
of evidence (there is often a problem of getting cooperation from fellow
service members involved in the incidents), but there are multiple cases
in which there appears to be hard evidence (such as photographs) but no
punishment is ever imposed. 107
Further, the majority of those found to have committed offenses that
fit the definition of war crimes seem to get off with fairly light sentences
such as reduction in rank, reprimand, minimal period of confinement, or
discharge from service.0 8 Although it is difficult to quantify these outcomes
due to the disparate nature of the underlying allegations, the overall
impression is that the U.S. has been less than aggressive in seeking to hold
its own personnel accountable.
Two high-profile cases have been painful examples of the U.S.
military's failure to maintain a culture that respects IHL principles and
holds those who violate them accountable. In 2010, a group of soldiers from
the U.S. Army's 5th Stryker Brigade who called themselves a "Kill Team"
were exposed by a Rolling Stone magazine article. The article discussed
a series of premeditated and calculated murders of Afghan civilians by
the Kill Team.' ° According to the German magazine Der Spiegel, "[tihey
allegedly carried out the crimes between January and May 2010 by using
guns and grenades to make it appear they were under attack in order to
justify killing civilians." 110 The group's apparent bloodlust and total lack
of respect for human life is particularly striking. For example, two of the
eventual defendants, Corporal Jeremy Morlock and Private First Class
104 See, e.g., Editorial, Pentagon Justice: No Officer Will Serve Jail Time for the Crimes at the
Abu Ghraib Prison, WASH. POST, Sep. 2, 2007, at B6.
IO5 See infra Appendix I.
Io6 See infra Appendix I.
107 See, e.g., Mark Boal, The Kill Team: How U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan Murdered Innocent
Civilians, ROLLING STONE (March 27, 2011 , 1o:o P.M.), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/
news/the-kill-team-201 10327.
Io8 See infra Appendix I.
I09 Boal, supra note 107.
11o Karin Assmann et al., Report Reveals Discipline Breakdown in Kill Team Brigade, SPIEGEL
ONLINE INT'L (Apr. 04, 201i), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/o,1518,754952,oo.
html.
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Andrew Holmes, shot fifteen-year-old Afghan farmer Gul Mudin as the
boy stood in a poppy field."' Morlock eventually admitted that the boy
was not a threat."' After killing the boy, both Morlock and Holmes posed
in pictures standing over the dead body, and then another soldier cut off
one of the boy's fingers and gave it to Holmes as a "trophy," which friends
say Holmes was proud of and carried around in a zip-lock bag."3 Holmes
was just recently sentenced to only seven years in prison."4 Holmes' case
was only one of many in an ongoing conspiracy by members of the Kill
Team to kill for sport. The ability of such a conspiracy to exist within a
military command structure for a lengthy period of time raised questions
that triggered an Army investigation into the matter.15
The Army's investigation revealed that the Kill Team's commanding
officer, Colonel Harry Tunnell, had made statements and created conditions
where such a Kill Team could come into existence." 6 Investigators were
critical of Tunnell's leadership, and he was ultimately censured for his
actions while in command." 7 The attitude of senior leaders like Tunnell
and others has shown a lack of respect for the life of Afghans and Iraqis, and
is not limited to U.S. Army forces.
An even more compelling and heartrending example is the Haditha
tragedy where U.S. Marines killed twenty-four unarmed Iraqi civilians,
including women, children, and a disabled elderly man." '8 On November
19, 2005, marines from 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines were traveling in a convoy
along a road near Haditha, Iraq."9 Without warning, a large lED suddenly
exploded directly beneath a Humvee in the convoy, which was occupied
by Lance Corporals Terrazas, Crossan and Guzman. L° Terrazas, who was
driving, was killed instantly while the other two marines were seriously
it I Boal, supra note 107.
I12 Id.
113 Id.
114 Adam Ashton, "Kill Team" Suspect Holmes Sentenced to Seven Years in Jail for Afghan
Murder, THE NEWS TRn. (Sept. 23, 2011, 10:58 a.m.), http://blog.thenewstribune.com/
military/2o I /09/23/kill-team-suspect-ask-for-mercy-in-afghan-murder-sentence/.
115 See Chris McGreal, US Military Investigates 'Death Squad' Accused of Murdering
Afghans, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 29, 2010, 19.45 GMT), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2o t o/dec/29/us-military-investigates-5th-stryker-brigade.
I I6 See Slap On the Wrist for 'Aggressive' Leader of Rogue Afghanistan 'Kill Squad' as Hes
Cleared ofResponsibilityforAtrocities, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Apr. 6,2011, 06:51 EST), http://www.
dailymail.co.uk/news/article-I 37388 i/Agressive-commander-Colonel-Harry-D-Tunnell-
U-S-army-Afghanistan-kill-squad-cleared-responsibility-atrocities.html.
117 See id.
1 I8 John M. Broder, Contradictions Cloud Inquiry Into 24 Iraqi Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2006, at Ai; Tim McGirk, Collateral Damage or Civilian Massacre in Haditha?, TIME MAG. (Mar.
19, 2oo6), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/o,8599, I 74649-I,oo.htm.
1 19 McGirk, supra note I 18.
io Broder, supra note I 18.
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injured.' Immediately thereafter, Staff Sergeant Wuterich, a squad leader
who had been traveling in the convoy, ordered five Iraqi men, a taxi driver
and four young men, out of a vehicle and shot them dead in the street."' 2
Within minutes, the platoon commander Lieutenant Kallop arrived at
the scene of the accident and reported receiving small arms fire from a
nearby house."2 3 In response, he ordered the marines to "take the house."'2 4
The marines entered this house and three other adjacent homes.' In the
ensuing mayhem, twenty-four Iraqi civilians were killed by the marines.2 6
From the very beginning, the Haditha case was handled shabbily by
the marines' chain of command. The marine commander did not order
an investigation into the incident,2 7 and an initial military press release
issued the next day reported that a bomb blast killed fifteen Iraqi civilians
and that the marines returned fire, killing eight insurgents."' The incident
went uninvestigated for almost four months until a Time Magazine reporter
broke the story after an Iraqi showed him video of the dead bodies.2 9 When
General Richard Huck, the marines' commanding general, was initially
confronted with the Time Magazine report in January 2006, he dismissed the
allegations as "insurgent propaganda" and made no effort to inquire further,
notwithstanding the fact that gruesome photographs were circulating that
showed women and children had been killed in their beds in Haditha.30
A full investigation was finally launched in February 2006 by U.S.
Army General Chiarelli, the second highest-ranking U.S. commander in
Iraq.' After reviewing the report of investigation filed by General Eldon
A. Bargewell, General Chiarelli concluded that General Huck-the same
General Huck who had dismissed the charges against Pantano-and two
subordinate commanders had been negligent in investigating the Haditha
incident by failing to follow up on inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Josh White, Marine Officer R ceives Immunity in Haditha Killings Ca e, WASH. POST, Apr.
20, 2007, at Az6.
124 Id.
125 See McGirk, supra note i18.
126 Broder, supra note i 18.
127 See McGirk, supra note i I8.
128 Press Release, 2d Marine Division, Camp Blue Diamond, U.S. Marine Corps, Press
Release # 05-141 (Nov. 20, 2oo5), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
haditha/etc/release.pdf.
129 See McGirk, supra note 18.
130 See Paul von Zielbauer, Propaganda Fear Cited in Account of Iraqi Killings, N.Y. TIMES,
May 6, 2007, at Ai.
131 See id; Press Statement, Col. Stewart Navarre, Haditha, Iraq Investigation (Dec. zi,
2oo6), available at http://www.marines.mil/unitlmarforcentlHaditha%zoDocuments/2oo6/
Haditha%2oPress%zoStatement%zoo6 122 I.htm.
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initial reporting of the incident. 13 General Bargewell's report itself was
more pointed in that it indicated that officers "may have willfully ignored
reports of the civilian deaths to protect themselves and their units from
blame." 133 Bargewell found that "nearly all Marines looked the other way
when confronted with early reports that many civilians had been shot in
fighting on the streets of Haditha."' 34 Some of General Bargewell's other
conclusions were troubling:
All levels of command tended to view civilian casualties,
even in significant numbers, as routine and as the natural and
intended result of insurgent tactics.... Statements by the chain
of command during interviews for this investigation, taken as
a whole, suggest that Iraqi civilian lives are not as important as
U.S. lives, their deaths are just the cost of doing business, and
that the Marines need to 'get the job done' no matter what it
takes."5
The cases of General Huck and the two subordinate commanders were
reviewed by General Mattis to consider whether criminal charges should be
filed under the UCMJ.136 Predictably, Mattis determined that the officers did
not violate the UCMJ, and no prosecution was ever commenced.'37 General
Mattis concluded only that "their actions, or inactions, demonstrated a lack
of due diligence" and forwarded their cases to the Secretary of the Navy for
administrative sanctions. 1' 3 General Huck and his two subordinates were
censured by the Secretary of the Navy in September 2006.139
Meanwhile, the marines involved in the incident claimed that they
"cleared" the houses using standard procedures in accordance with the
rules of engagement. 4° Under these procedures, marines would throw
fragmentary hand grenades and then spray the rooms in houses with
machine gun fire before entering.' 41 Their accounts of the killings were
predictably self-serving and at odds with other evidence made available to
investigators. For example, a medical examination by a doctor at the local
132 Eric Schmitt & David S. Cloud, General Faults Marine Response to Iraq Killings, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2006, at A1.
133 Josh White, Report on Haditha Condemns Marines; Signs of Misconduct Were Ignored, U.S.
GeneralSays, WASH. PosT, April 2 1, 2007, at At.
134 Id.
135 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
136 Press Release, U.S. Marine Corps, Senior Marine Officers Sanctioned for Haditha
Incident (Sept. 5, 2007), available at http://www.expose-the-war-profiteers.orgarchive/
government/2007-2/20070905.pdf.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 Id.
140 White,supra note 123.
141 Id.
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Haditha hospital the night of the killings revealed that no organs of the
victims were slashed by shrapnel, as they would have been if killed by a
roadside bomb, and that it appeared that the victims were shot in the head
and chest from close range. 4 Even NCIS investigators concluded that the
manner in which the individuals were killed seemed more consistent with
deliberate killings than a situation where the marines were mistaken about
whether they were armed insurgents or not.
43
Although charges were finally brought against eight marines in
connection with the 'incident, the subsequent handling of the cases
demonstrated that the Marine Corps' chain of command did not take the
allegations of war crimes seriously."4 Of the eight charged, only four marines
were alleged to have been personally involved in the killings.14 The other
four accused were commissioned officers in the chain of command that
were charged for either failing to investigate (dereliction) or as participants
in an attempted cover up) 46
The ultimate disposition of the cases is somewhat shocking. Charges
against six of the accused were dismissed before trial. 47 Interestingly, in
the six cases where charges were dismissed, the officer dismissing those
charges was General James Mattis, 4' whose "No better friend, no worse
enemy" motto had been placed on a placard near the bodies of the two
Iraqis killed by Pantano.' 49 Of the marines charged, only two cases went to
a fully contested court-martial trial.5 ° Luitenant Andrew Grayson, charged
with obstruction of justice for ordering the destruction of photographs of
the bodies, was acquitted of all charges by a marine court-martial panel. 5'
142 McGirk, supra note i18.
143 See Thom Shanker et al., Military Expected to Report Marines Killed Iraqi Civilians, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2oo6, at Ai.
144 Press Release, Haditha, Iraq Investigation: Initial Charges and Specifications (Dec.
2 1, 2oo6), available at http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/DomCLIC/Docs/NLP/US/
HadithaList%200f%aochargesall-cases.pdf.
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 Case Dropped Against Officer Accused in Iraq Killings, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.cOm/2oo8/o6/i 8/us/i8haditha.html.
148 See Two Marines to Face Courts Martial in Haditha Incident, CNN (Oct. I9, 2007),
http://articles.cnn.com/2oo7-1 o-I9/us/marines.haditha-I-miguel-terrazas-jeffrey-chessani-
haditha-incident?_s=PM:US.
149 See Letter from Major General J.N. Mattis, U.S Marines, to All Hands (Mar. 2003),
available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Genmattisltr.jpg (stating Mattis's "No better
friend, no worse enemy" motto).
150 See Charlie Savage & Elisabeth Bumiller, An Iraqi Massacre, a Light Sentence and a
Question of Military Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.coml2o 2/o 1/28us/
an-iraqi-massacre-a-light-sentence-and-a-question-of-military-justice.html.
151 Press Release, Camp Pendleton Media Center, Verdict Announced at General
Court-Martial in Haditha, Iraq Investigation (June 4, 2008), available at http://www.expose-
the-war-profiteers.org/archive/government/2008-1l2oo8o6o4.pdf.
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More recently, Staff Sergeant Frank Wuterich, alleged to have personally
shot many of the victims, was allowed to plead guilty to negligent dereliction
of duty and received no jail time.15 He was subsequently discharged from
the service with a General Discharge under Honorable Conditions.153 This
final outcome puts an exclamation point on the fact that no one truly has
been held accountable by the military justice system for what appear to
be egregious violations of IHL. The command climate* that led to both
the Stryker Brigade and Haditha incidents, and the ultimate disposition
of those cases, is particularly instructive and will be explored more fully
as I address causes of the lack of accountability for crimes committed by
U.S. personnel. The evidence suggests that these cases are not anomalous
aberrations.
One instinctively asks how Americans, who have traditionally been
committed to the rule of law and notions of justice, can be involved or
tolerate this state of affairs. There are several reasons why the U.S. has failed
to live up to legal and moral obligations under the Geneva Conventions to
actively prosecute war crimes: Failure of leadership from the highest levels
of government, the negative incentives for investigation and prosecution
that flow from the doctrine of command responsibility, the changing nature
of warfare, significant logistical problems regarding prosecution of war
crimes in U.S. federal district courts, lack of clear lines as to prosecutorial
authority, reluctance to apply the Geneva Conventions to the conflict with
al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, and lack of political will due to
the potential lose-lose situations that evolve from those prosecutions.
The first of these reasons has been well-documented by critics of
the Bush and Obama Administrations' policies in the War on Terror. In
particular, many have persuasively argued that high-level leaders in the
Bush Administration fostered a climate that encouraged deviation from
the norms established under the Geneva Conventions.'-' The "enhanced
interrogation" program approved by the Administration for use by CIA
and Department of Defense interrogators is one of the most publicized
features of this top-down attitude of disrespect to the conventions.
Waterboarding, the most well-known and controversial of the approved
152 Id.; Michael S. Schmidt, Anger in Iraq After Plea Bargain Over 2005 Massacre, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/zo12/0l/25/world/middleeast/anger-in-iraq-
after-plea-bargain-over-haditha-killings.html. Negligent dereliction of duty is a violation of
Article 92 of the UCMJ and is punishable by a maximum of confinement for three months and
forfeiture of two-thirds base pay for three months. MCM, supra note 17, at Part IV(16)(e)(3)
(A). No other punishment is authorized.
153 US Marine Convicted Over Haditha Killings Discharged from Service, TME GUARDIAN
(Feb. 23, 2012, 13:3 1 EST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2o I 2/feb/23/us-marine-frank-
wuterich-discharged.
154 See, e.g., Jonathan Hafetz, Stretching Precedent Beyond Recognition: The Misplaced Reliance
on World War H Cases in the "War on Terror", z8 REv. LITIG. 365 (2oo8). See also Derek Jinks &
David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97 (2004).
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enhanced interrogation techniques, was employed with the endorsement
of top-level officials notwithstanding strong criticism by legal experts
that waterboarding violated the U.N. Convention on Torture, which
the U.S. ratified on October 21, 1994. I's Former Vice-President Dick
Cheney remains an unrepentant supporter of this technique in service
of "keeping America safe." ' 6 As if more were needed, the extensive and
well-documented abuses of detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq are
compelling evidence of both leadership failure and complicity in systematic
violations of the law of war.157
Unfortunately, this attitude is not just confined to civilian political
leadership. In the military model of war crimes prosecution, which I have
identified as the primary method of accountability for U.S. war crimes, the
military commander is put in the position of both leading and disciplining
his troops.158 For non-war crimes prosecutions in the military justice system,
the commander does not usually have significant conflicts of interest. It is
in his or her best interest to foster good order and discipline in the ranks by
quickly and efficiently punishing violators.
However, in cases of war crimes the calculus is different. Since the
commanders and their troops are geared toward battle with a common
enemy, commanders are in the unenviable position of both ordering men to
do battle with a wily and evasive enemy, and then holding them accountable
for conduct that violates the laws of war. For some commanders, this seems
to create a nearly insurmountable challenge because of the emotions that
are triggered by combat.
In addition, the doctrine of command responsibility creates at best a
significant tension, and at worst an irreconcilable conflict of interest, for
commanders who are essentially the linchpin to any effective enforcement
of the Geneva Conventions. While there may be questions surrounding
when, or if, a commander should be responsible for crimes committed by
his subordinates, the fear that they may also be held responsible for war
155 There have been several memoranda dealing with official endorsement of enhanced
interrogation techniques, which are collected in George Washington University's National
Security Archive. The Interrogation Documents: Debating U.S. Policy and Methods, THE NAT'L
SECURITY ARCHIVE (July 13, 2004), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 127/.
156 Full transcript: Dick Cheney 's Speech to the American Enterprise Institute, POLITICO, 3-5
(May 21, 2009), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/o5o9/2z823.html.
157 See generally Abu Ghraib, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/news/
international/countriesandterritories/iraq/abughraib/index.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2012).
158 Under the UCMJ, the military commander has almost unlimited discretion in how
to handle offenses. Unless the accused objects, the commander himself may impose non-
judicial punishment, a practice under the UCMJ that allows for the imposition of relatively
minor punishments without a high level of due process. The UCMJ also gives commanders
virtually unlimited discretion in deciding how to handle the case. The range could be from
nothing all the way up to a general court-martial. to U.S.C. § 86o (2oo6).
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crimes of their subordinates may influence their treatment of those accused
of such crimes.1 9 Under IHL,
[a] commander, that is to say, anyone in a position of command
whatever his rank might be, including a Head of State or the
lowest non-commissioned officer, who issues an order to commit
a war crime or a grave breach is equally guilty of the offense
with the subordinate actually committing it. He is also liable
if, knowing or having information from which he should have
concluded that a subordinate was going to commit such a crime,
he failed to prevent it."6
Thus, if a commander's subordinates committed a war crime, which the
commander ordered or should have prevented, the commander may "go
easy" on that soldier to prevent drawing attention to the crime, which may
then prompt a prosecution of himself.
Another possible reason why commanders may be reluctant to punish
their subordinates has to do with significant changes in the way wars are
fought. When the Geneva Conventions were signed in 1949, warfare was
much different. Although the world was in the midst of the great change in
the post-Atomic era, the Conventions' drafters were operating from a much
different construct. Less than ten years before the conventions were signed,
nation-states were still declaring wars and uniformed armies lined up in
battle array against each other. However, by the time the U.S. ratified the
Conventions in 1955, the world was beginning to see profound differences
in the way that future conflicts would be conducted. The changes included
a move away from conflicts where large uniformed land armies opposed
one another toward insurgencies and guerrilla warfare, typified by the
Communist Malayan Insurgency against British rule running from 1948-
1960 and the French Indochina War pitting French colonial forces against
Vietnamese communist insurgents. 6' For the U.S., of course, the Vietnam
War, beginning with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964, was another
such conflict. 16 The short-lived 1991 Gulf War between the U.S. and Iraq
is an anomaly in the history of warfare since 1955, and is the only example
where a large land force of the U.S. engaged against another large land force
in a "stand-up" battle. 163 Since IHL was created with the WWII paradigm
in mind, guerrilla wars and insurgencies have not fitted neatly into the
159 See Timothy Wu & Yong-Sung Kang, Criminal Liability for the Actions of Subordinates -
The Doctrine of Command Responsibility and Its Analogues in United States Law, 38 HARv. INT'L L.J.
272, 278-90 (1997) (discussing the appropriate mens rea standard and scope of duty to prevent
crimes by subordinates).
160 LESLIE C. GREEN, TIIE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 303 (2d ed. 2ooo).
See also Wu & Kang, supra note 159.
i61 See SOLIS, supra note 36, at I 9.
162 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Star. 384 (1964).
163 See, e.g., Time/ine: U.S. Military Actions and Wars, 1775-1994, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/americanexperience/features/timeline/warletters/ (last accessedDec.. 30, 2012).
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framework envisioned by the drafters of the Conventions."6 Consequently,
there seems to have been a trend toward declining respect for IHL since
these insurgencies are mounted by non-state actors who are not party to
the Conventions.
Unfortunately, the War on Terror has created conditions likely to cause
a continuing decline of respect for IHL, since many argue that because
"terrorists" do not follow the rules, then we should not either.'65 In the
bygone era when state actors were involved in the greatest part of waging
war, professional militaries of the state had a fairly strong monopoly on
the violence of war. Of course, there have always been non-state actors
engaged in the business of inflicting death and mayhem, but by and large
the mechanism of the state system limited violence in many respects.
Under this regime, wars were fought by professional soldiers who were
regularly trained in laws of war as set forth in the Geneva Conventions.6 6
This training along with reinforcement and oversight from the power of the
government greatly increased the likelihood that IHL would be followed.
However, the rise of international terrorist movements has altered the
will of many government leaders, who are now more inclined to scoff at
the law of war. For example, when considering the applicability of IHL to
the War on Terror, future Attorney General Alberto Gonzales showed little
respect for the continuing viability of the Geneva Conventions, calling
certain provisions of them "quaint."'67 It is easy to see why many leaders
are so dismissive of the Conventions, since experience has shown that those
engaged in terrorism wage war in direct contravention of the principles
of the Geneva Conventions, focusing on "soft" civilian targets rather than
"hard" military ones.168 Moreover, since these organizations are non-state
actors, they are not even eligible to become parties to the Conventions.16 9
Notwithstanding their ineligibility to join in the Conventions, they have
evinced a clear pattern of behavior that is inimical to the spirit of the
Conventions.
164 See SoLIS, supra note 36, at 119-20.
165 See Ingrid Detter, The Law of War and Illegal Combatants, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1049,
1078-79 (2007).
166 See Practice Relating to Rule 142. Instruction in International Humanitarian Law Within
Armed Forces, INT'L COMMITTEE. OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/
docs/vz_couus-rulel42 (last visited Dec. 30, 2012) (describing how the U.S. instructs its
armed forces about the Geneva Conventions).
167 Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales to the President 2 (Jan. 25, 2002), available
at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 127/02.01 .25.pdf.
168 See, e.g., NAT'L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., 2010 REPORT ON TERRORISM 15 (Apr. 30,
201 I) (reporting that of the 13,186 terror-related deaths in 2010, only 1378 were members of
a military force), available at www.riskintel.com/library/755.
169 See How the ICRC Helps States Sign Up to IHL Treaties - and Implement Them, INT'L
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (Oct. 27, 20O), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/
legal-fact-sheet/implementation-ihl-factsheet-21O-l0-27.htm.
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Many in the U.S. military internally justify the atrocities that I decry
in this article on the grounds that when one is fighting a war against an
opponent who does not follow IHL, then that should relieve U.S. forces of
any obligation to obey the law of war. Although this argument resonates with
a sort of playground fairness, it is not the law by which the U.S. has chosen
to bind itself. No matter how the terrorist forces conduct themselves, U.S.
forces are still obliged to obey the law of war. 170
Although these theories may help explain why military authorities
have been remiss in prosecuting and deterring violations of IHL, they do
not necessarily explain the failure of the DOJ to pursue any prosecutions
under 18 U.S.C. § 2441. Even though war crimes committed by military
members who were discharged before discovery of the crimes might give
rise to a significant number of cases for prosecution under § 2441, the most
obvious scenario where war crimes prosecutions might have arisen over the
past ten years under this statute is in cases involving civilian employees
of U.S. government contractors. Although high profile incidents in which
employees of contractors like Blackwater killed significant numbers of
Iraqi civilians, there have been no prosecutions by DOJ under § 2441.171
Given the number of these cases and the extensive media coverage they
garnered, one might expect that some prosecutions under this statute
might have been commenced. However, no such prosecutions have ever
been initiated by DOJ under the statute.17
Commentators have offered a number of explanations for the lack of
prosecution of war crimes under § 2441. The most common reason advanced
is that there is a significant logistical problem regarding prosecution of war
crimes in U.S. federal district courts.'73 As mentioned earlier, prosecution
of these crimes is handled primarily by USAOs and DOJ components,
which are located in the U.S. On the other hand, most war crimes are
likely to occur overseas where military personnel and civilian contractors
are operating in combat or security roles. 7 4 Prosecutors undoubtedly face
extreme difficulties building cases against offenders from thousands of
miles away. This distance, and the likely fact that the event occurred in
a war zone, makes it difficult for DOJ prosecutors to collect physical and
170 See generally JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S LEGAL CTR. AND SCM., LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK
(2005), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military-Law/pdf/law-war-handbook-2005.pdf.
171 See David Scheffer, Closing the Impunity Gap in U.S. Law, 8 Nw. U. J. INT'L HuM. RTs.
30, 41 (2009) (explaining that "no such war crimes have ever been prosecuted under the War
Crimes Act of 1996").
172 Id.
173 See David H. Chen, Note, Holding "Hired Guns" Accountable: The Legal Status of Private
Security Contractors in Iraq, 32 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 101, 107-08 (2009).
174 For a discussion of a unique approach to this problem, see Alan F Williams, The
Case for Overseas Article III Courts: The Blackwater Effect and Criminal Accountability in the Age of
Privatization, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 45 (2OIO).
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forensic evidence to help build its case, and would require them to bring
any witnesses, parties, or evidence to the U.S. for a trial. 7 s
Investigations of the incidents in Iraq involving the killing of Iraqi
civilians by employees of Blackwater provide an example of the difficulties
faced when conducting these long-distance investigations.
[A]lthough there [were] FBI personnel stationed in Iraq, their
focus [was on] counter-terrorism; the team that investigated
the Nisour Square shooting [of seventeen Iraqi civilians by
Blackwater security personnel] had to be deployed from the
United States. Investigations would undoubtedly be hampered
by such delays, as well as by unfamiliarity with local culture,
security issues, and interagency disputes that could well arise. 76
Similar difficulty obtaining evidence and immunity given by State
Department officials in Iraq led the DOJ to decline prosecution of Andrew
J. Moonen, a Blackwater employee who allegedly killed a bodyguard of
the Iraqi vice president in 2006.117 FBI agents traveled to Baghdad several
times to interview witnesses and collect evidence, but the DOJ could
not build a sufficient case against Moonen.' 78 Another example of widely
reported acts that may have qualified for prosecution under § 2441 is
the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal: "While both civilian contractors
and military service-people were implicated in the abuse, only members
of the military have been prosecuted for those crimes. Investigators and
potential prosecutors of the civilian contractors cited problems with
evidence collection, witness interviewing, and crime scene investigation as
impediments to mounting successful prosecutions."'79
Another challenge related to bringing contractors who commit crimes
to justice is the delegation of prosecutorial authority. Using prosecutions
under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) as an example-
because MEJA can be used to prosecute a broader range of civilian
crimes committed abroad under federal civilian law than § 244118°-
commentators have found the division of prosecutorial responsibilities
between different governmental departments unclear. 8 ' There are federal
175 See Chen, supra note 173, at 107-o8.
176 Id. at io8.
177 James Risen, Efforts to Prosecute Blackwater Are Collapsing, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2o l o/ o/2 i/world/21 contractors.html?pagewanted=all.
178 Id.
179 Katherine Jackson, Not Quite a Civilian, Not Quite a Soldier: How Five Words Could
Subject Civilian Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to Military Jurisdiction, 27 J. NAT'L Ass'N
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 255, 257 (2007).
18o See 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2006) (providing for prosecution of any felony under the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the U.S.).
181 David A. Melson, Military Jurisdiction Over Civilian Contractors: A Historical Overview,
52 NAVAL L. REV. 277,316-17 (2005).
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regulations suggesting that the DoD is responsible for initiating criminal
investigations under MEJA, but that the DOJ will ultimately prosecute
the offender.18 2 However, "[t]he point at which the Department of
Justice takes responsibility for the investigation is unclear." 18 3 Some have
suggested that this lack of clarification has impeded prompt investigation
of contractor crimes and may have "contributed to the failure to prosecute
any civilian for crimes committed in Iraq. ' I84 While MEJA prosecutions
are limited to civilians supporting the mission of the DOD, 8 1 it may be
that many crimes that could end up being prosecuted under § 2441 might
begin as investigations or prosecutions under MEJA because it would
seem that most civilians overseas who are in a position to commit war
crimes would be there as a result of major operations by the DoD, such
as wars or contingency operations. Thus, this confusion between different
departments could also impede prosecutions under § 2441.
Further, if there is confusion between the DoD and DOJ over contractors
specifically covered by a statute meant to facilitate prosecution of civilians,
it might be assumed that there is likely greater confusion between other
agencies that employ civilians in war zones, such as the State Department
or CIA, regarding prosecution of contractors not covered by a specific
statute. These concerns may not be as compelling in prosecutions for war
crimes brought against military personnel (and other individuals subject
to courts-martial) because there are more detailed guidance directives in
place that outline how the DoD and DOJ are expected to work together
when the accused is subject to the UCMJ. 186
Another explanation advanced for the lack of prosecutions under § 2441
is that there may be a "preference of the government to punish war crimes
'only if they are committed by enemy nationals or by persons serving
the interests of the enemy State.""'87 Also, because war crimes are often
182 See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 5525. 11; CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS
EMPLOYED By OR ACCOMPANYING THE ARMED FORCES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, CERTAIN
SERVICE MEMBERS, AND FORMER SERVICE MEMBERS (2005), available at http://www.dtic.mil/
whs/directives/corres/pdf/55251 I p.pdf.
183 Melson, supra note 181, at 316.
184 Jackson, supra note 179, at 268.
185 See 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a)(I) (defining MEJA jurisdiction as applying to those parties
"employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States").
186 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE No. 5525.7, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEENTHE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICEAND THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE RELATING TO THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CERTAIN CRIMES, (1985)
(certified current as of NOV. 2 1, 2003), available at http://biotech.law.Isu.edu/blaw/dodd/corres/
pdf2/d55257p.pdf.
187 Christopher C. Burris, Time for Congressional Action: The Necessity of Delineating the
Jurisdictional Responsibilities of Federal District Courts, Courts-Martial, and Military Commissions
to Try Violations of the Laws of War, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 4, 8I (2005) (quoting U.S. DEP'T
OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE para. 507 (1956)). See also
Margaret Prystowsky, The Constitutionality of Court-Martialing Civilian Contractors in traq, 7
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committed in times and areas of combat or war, the accused war criminals
often assert self-defense claims which might be persuasive because in war
zones the population is regularly armed. 8'
Further, since the War Crimes Act was passed in 1996, the U.S. has only
been involved in two major arenas-Iraq and Afghanistan-that would
provide the environment in which war crimes are likely to be committed."9
As previously mentioned, during the early years of the operations in those
forums, the "Bush administration ... maintained that the War Crimes Act
does not address any of the cases of U.S. civilians [possibly committing
war crimes] since the protections of the Third Geneva Convention do not
apply to members of al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations."' 9 ° The
administration even had the DOJ provide memoranda supporting its claim
that the War Crimes Act did not apply to al-Qaeda or Taliban detainees. 9'
As previously explained, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held
that Common Article 3 does apply to the War on Terrorism, which implies
that civilians and members of the Armed Forces can be prosecuted under
§ 2441 for war crimes committed in Iraq and Afghanistan against al-Qaeda
and the Taliban. 192 Even after Hamdan, it may be fair to assume that the
DOJ feels little pressure to prosecute U.S. citizens under § 2441 for crimes
committed in Iraq and Afghanistan because the executive branch for
years argued against providing the Geneva Conventions' protections to
combatants found there.
Further, because the head of the DOJ Criminal Division, an Assistant
Attorney General who works directly under the Deputy Attorney General,
is required to expressly approve the initiation and advancement of
prosecutions under § 2441, the decision to prosecute under that statute
must be authorized by some of the top-level members of the DOJ.' 93 By
CARDOZO PUB. L. Poi'y & ETHICS J. 45, 58 (2008).
188 DonnaMarie McKinnon, Federal Civilian Criminal Prosecutions of Private Military
Contractors: Inherent Legal Ethics Issues, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 695, 703 (201 1).
189 There have been other operations which could yield "war crimes," such as NATO
bombings during the Kosovo War and even the recent campaign in Libya; however, those
other operations did not place civilians or military members in the field to the extent of the
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
19o Ryan P. Logan, The Detainee Treatment Act of2oo5: Embodying U.S. Values to Eliminate
Detainee Abuse by Civilian Contractors and Bounty Hunters in Afghanistan and Iraq, 39 VANrD. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1605, 1624 (2006).
191 See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President (Jan. 22, 2oo2), availableathttp://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB 127/02.01.22.pdf. Copies of previous and subsequent memoranda, generally focused
on interrogation of prisoners, can be found at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB 127/.
192 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630-32 (2oo6).
193 In fact, as a testament to the status of AAGs, the President of the United States
appoints individuals to the position of AAG with the advice and consent of the Senate. 28
U.S.C. § 506 (2006).
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requiring prosecutions under § 2441 to pass though such a high-level
chain of authorization, it is evident that the government views § 2441 war
crimes as matters of extreme significance. It is possible that these matters
are deemed of such importance because of the potential effects they may
have-obviously for the immediate victims and perpetrators involved, but
also in the international community. Considering the strong reaction to
"war crimes" by the international community, public acknowledgment-
in the form of criminal prosecution-that U.S. citizens have committed
such crimes may lead to strained relations or outright resentment from
other nations. Because of the significant consequences and fallout that
are often attached to the commission of war crimes, the executive branch
entrusts decisions regarding § 2441 prosecutions only to high-ranking DOJ
officials. 194
The vetting of war crimes prosecutions by such high-ranking officials
in itself may be another reason why § 2441 has not been used because
"domestic criminal prosecution of fellow citizens requires political will,
particularly in the United States system where the prosecutor is not
independent of the Executive."' 19 War crimes prosecutions are likely to
generate publicity in the media and many political appointees may wish
to distance themselves from potential lose-lose situations that evolve
from those prosecutions. For example, an Assistant Attorney General
that approves a war crimes prosecution may face a backlash or public
disapproval for accusing a fellow American of such heinous crimes if the
accused is eventually found innocent. On the other hand, even a successful
prosecution of a war crime could produce some sense of betrayal by the
executive branch of those actually involved on the ground in a war zone. 96
These hypothetical outcomes aside, the simple fact that the branches of the
military-and civilian contractors that support them and other government
agencies-are located in the same branch of government as those who
would be responsible for prosecuting them as war criminals may be enough
to discourage the DOJ leadership from permitting prosecutions under §
2441. Executive branch leaders would likely want to avoid accusations that
they promoted, condoned, or knew of war crimes being committed by their
subordinates because of the negative publicity and potential liability that
may follow. This risk could be prevented by pressuring Assistant Attorney
Generals to decline to approve prosecutions under § 2441 in all but the
194 See USAM, supra note 89, at § 9-2.139.
195 Benjamin G. Davis, Refluat Stercus: A Citizen's View of Criminal Prosecution in U.S.
Domestic Courts of High-Level U.S. Civilian Authority and Military Generals for Torture and Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 23 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMM. 503, 517 (2008).
196 The argument could follow along the lines of: war is ugly, ugly stuff happens in
war, and we may be handicapping servicemen and contractors by establishing precedent, and
creating a fear in their minds, that they may be prosecuted as a war criminal for decisions they
make in the heat nf the mnment.
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exceptional case. Professor David Luban, a foremost authority in this area,
summarized these concerns as follows:
The fundamental fact of life is that [18 U.S.C. § 2441] has never
been used. Calling something a war crime is political dynamite.
So, if you're going to prosecute it at all, you will prosecute it
as murder, manslaughter, assault - anything but a war crime.
Passaro[, a CIA contractor prosecuted for beating an Iraqi
detainee to death with a flashlight,] plainly could have been
prosecuted for war crimes, but the charges against him were
for assault and homicide - and, because the investigation was
botched, he was convicted only of two misdemeanors and one
felony assault charge; that, remember, is for beating a detainee
to death.... Bottom line on war crimes prosecutions, in practice:
fuggedaboudit. 197
Taking into account all of the considerations involved when prosecuting
a crime under § 2441,
[t]he complexity of the exercise[, including logistical problems of
investigations, consultation with various DOJ components and
other federal agencies, approval by DOJ leadership, possibility
of straining international relations, and risk of domestic political
consequences,] may explain why there has been no war crimes
prosecution under the War Crimes Act of 1996, as amended, and
why no U.S. attorney has sought to portray any prosecution in
the federal courts as a war crimes prosecution.' 98
III. RECOMMENDATION TO CORRECT THE PROBLEMS
A recurring theme in this article has been the importance of leadership
from both political and military officials on war crimes issues. In order to
protect U.S. service members from abuses like torture and maltreatment, it
is critical that the U.S. enforce its obligations under the Geneva Conventions
by investigating and prosecuting war crimes committed by those serving
the U.S. Immediate steps should be taken by the President to restore the
credibility of the U.S. in the international community on war crimes issues.
An important first step that I recommend-and not merely a symbolic
one-would be for the President to issue an Executive Order directing the
Departments of Defense and Justice to review and enhance procedures for
the investigation and prosecution of violations of the Geneva Conventions.
I recommend the President create a joint Department of Defense
and Department of Justice War Crimes Review Commission specifically
empowered to review and initiate prosecution in those cases where credible
evidence exists that war crimes have been committed and prosecution has
197 David Luban, Prosecuting Blackwater - A Brief Tour of the Law, BALKINIZATION (Sept.
29, 2007, i:07 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/o9/blackwater-security-guards-killings-
of.html.
198 See Scheffer, supra note 17 1, at 49.
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never been commenced by appropriate DoD military authorities or the
DOJ.
Establishing this Commission could likely be accomplished most
efficiently and effectively by drawing upon already existing executive
branch entities. Based on the expertise and mission of the DOJ Human
Rights and Special Prosecutions Section discussed above, I believe that
one or more members from the HRSP Section should be designated to
serve on this Commission. I also recommend that members of a specially
created group within the DoD, the DoD Law of War Working Group, be
designated to serve on this Commission.
In 2006, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England issued Defense
Directive 2311.01E which, among other things, created the DoD Law of
War Working Group (DLOWWG). 199 The Directive mandated that the
DLOWWG include representatives from the DoD General Counsel's
Office, the General Counsel's Office for each military department, the
Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Judge
Advocate Generals for each of the armed services.5 0 Secretary England
tasked the DLOWWG specifically with "develop[ing] and coordinat[ing]
law of war initiatives and issues ... [and] other law of war matters as they
arise. ' ' 1 Therefore, the background and expertise that the members of
the DLOWWG bring to war crimes issues makes these representatives
particularly well-suited to serving on the proposed Commission. Further,
the integration of members of both DoD and DOJ on the Commission will
serve to provide a comprehensive forum for the consideration and vetting
of cases meriting prosecution.
The work of the Commission should be both prospective and
retrospective. The prospective component of its work would include the
review of all future "reportable incidents" of war crimes that result in a
decision by the military commander to not prosecute. DoD Directive
2311.01E defines a "reportable incident" as "[a] possible, suspected, or
alleged violation of the law of war, for which there is credible information,
or conduct during military operations other than war that would constitute
a violation of the law of war if it occurred during an armed conflict." '
DoD has ordered that "[a]ll reportable incidents committed by or against
U.S. personnel, enemy persons, or any other individual [must be] reported
I99 DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE No. 231I.oiE: DoD LAw OF WAR PROGRAM (2006)
(certified current as of February 22, 2011), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
corres/pdf/231 ioIe.pdf.
200 Id. at para. 5.1.4. I purposely omit reference to the fact that the U.S. Marine Corps
does not have a Judge Advocate General Corps as do all of the other armed services. Instead,
that role is served by two offices: the Counsel to the Commandant of the Marine Corps and
the Staff Judge Advocate of the Marine Corps. The DoD Law of War Working Group includes
representatives from those offices as well as the other representatives listed above.
201 Id.
202 Id. at para. 3.2.
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promptly, investigated thoroughly, and, where appropriate, remedied by
corrective action." ' 3 Mandating referral of all "reportable incidents" in
which a military commander declines prosecution to the DoD/DOJ War
Crimes Review Commission for independent review would likely serve as
a way to significantly enhance internal U.S. accountability for war crimes.
Members of the Commission could provide a more neutral and detached
review of cases than military commanders confronted with the conflicts of
interest that were discussed in Part II. If the Commission were empowered
to independently review these cases and determine whether credible
evidence exists to initiate prosecutions, the process could serve as an
important check on the possible corrupting impact of the aforementioned
conflicts of interest and the doctrine of command responsibility. Creating a
mandatory Commission review of all cases in which prosecution is declined
would also serve to encourage commanders to thoroughly investigate and
prosecute IHL violations in the first instance. Knowing that their decisions
on these matters are subject to an independent review would likely
encourage commanders to thoroughly and critically evaluate incidents that
may give rise to war crime liability. Moreover, since commanders who do
not investigate and prosecute appropriately could face personal criminal
liability under the existing doctrine of command responsibility, a mandatory
subsequent review by the Commission would likely deter commanders
from sweeping incidents under the rug in an attempt to protect both their
subordinates and themselves from possible criminal liability for war crimes.
The work of the Commission should also be retrospective. The
Commission should be empowered to review all past "reportable incidents"
where prosecution by military commanders has been declined. Because
of military jurisdiction and the unique provisions of the War Crimes Act,
this proposal would afford DOJ an opportunity to begin meaningful
prosecutions of cases where prosecution may have been improperly
declined by the military commanders. To understand how this would work,
one must look at the peculiarities of military jurisdiction, the doctrine of
double jeopardy, and the statute of limitations provisions of the U.S. Code.
All military members who may commit war crimes are subject to
both military jurisdiction under the UCMJ and general federal criminal
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 2441. Therefore, a decision by a military
commander to decline prosecution under the UCMJ does not bar the DOJ
from pursuing a case under the War Crimes Act even if the military member
is still on active duty. Under the current Memorandum of Understanding,
military commanders have primary prosecutorial jurisdiction and the DOJ
will not normally prosecute these cases even though it has concurrent
jurisdiction with military authorities.2 14 Of course, once a military member
203 Id. at para. 4.4.
204 See USAM, supra note 89, at Title 9 Criminal Resource Manual 669, available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading_room/usam/title9/crmoo669.htm.
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is discharged from active duty, he or she is no longer subject to military
criminal jurisdiction under the UCMJ,0 s but § 2441 continues to provide
jurisdiction for prosecution of those personnel who were discharged
without ever being prosecuted for war crimes they committed while on
active duty."°
The only instance where a prosecution would be barred would be if
the individual had already been subject to jeopardy under the UCMJ.
Jeopardy attaches under the UCMJ upon the presentation of evidence in a
court-martial proceeding. 07 Therefore, in those cases where evidence has
been presented or there has been a conviction under the UCMJ for the
underlying conduct, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution
bars subsequent prosecution by the DOJ. 0 However, in any case where
jeopardy has not attached under the UCMJ, the possibility of prosecution
by the DOJ remains-subject, of course, to any applicable statute of
limitations that may apply. It is important to remember in this context
that an Article 32 investigation is not a trial. Thus, even if evidence were
presented during an Article 32 investigation, jeopardy does not attach and
the case may be prosecuted later by the DOJ notwithstanding a military
commander's decision to dismiss the charges after the Article 32.
Any subsequent prosecution by the DOJ would have to be commenced
before the applicable statute of limitations runs. Section 2441 of U.S. Code
Title 10 does not contain a statute of limitations in its text, and Title 18,
Chapter 213, which lists the statutes of limitations applicable to various
federal crimes under Title 18, does not list a specific limitation for § 2441.219
Thus, the general statutes of limitations applicable to all Title 18 crimes
apply to § 2441. For war crimes that do not result in the death of the victim
(and are therefore not punishable by death), the general "catchall" non-
capital federal statute of limitations of five years applies.210 However, for
war crimes that result in death, there is no statute of limitations and a
prosecution could be commenced by the DOJ up until the time of the
defendant's death.211 Since most alleged war crimes will occur overseas,
it is also important to consider the tolling provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3292.
Under this section, if the evidence of a war crime is in a foreign country and
the government is seeking evidence to be turned over by a foreign court
or authority, the statute of limitations can be suspended for up to three
205 See 1o U.S.C. § 802 (2006).
2o6 See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(2oo6) (providing jurisdiction over members of Armed Forces or
a U.S. national).
207 See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 69o-9 1 (1949) (holding that double jeopardy clause
applies to courts-martial). See also Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
2o8 Grafton v. United States, 2o6 U.S. 333, 348-55 (1907).
209 See 18 U.S.C. 8H 3281-3299 (2006).
210 Id. at § 3282(a).
211 Id. at § 3281.
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years. ' Thus, this section extends the statute of limitations to eight years
for those war crimes not resulting in death to a person, but has no effect
on war crimes resulting in death since there is no statute of limitations for
those offenses.
The Pantano case may be used as an example of how these considerations
could affect a possible war crimes prosecution. Even though General Huck
declined prosecution and Pantano was given an honorable discharge, he is
still subject to prosecution by the DOJ under 18 U.S.C. § 2441 for several
reasons. First, his conduct included the willful killing of two persons, so
he is liable under § 2441(c)(1) which criminalizes willful killing as a grave
breach of the Geneva Conventions."1 3 Even though the conduct occurred
overseas in Iraq, § 2441 applies extraterritorially so Pantano is liable.
214
Finally, since death did occur, the statute of limitations has not run,
meaning the DOJ retains jurisdiction under § 2441 and may still initiate a
prosecution.2 15 This same analysis would apply to the Haditha defendants
who had their charges dismissed before trial by General Mattis, or in any
other similar case.
If this possibility seems far-fetched, the celebrated case of former Army
Green Beret doctor Jeffrey MacDonald, whose story is told in the book
Fatal Vision, is instructive.2 16 MacDonald was serving on active duty at Fort
Bragg in 1970 when his pregnant wife and two daughters were brutally
murdered.21 7 The evidence pointed to MacDonald as the killer, and he was
initially charged by the Army for the-murders.""8 An Article 32 investigation
was conducted, and the investigating officer ultimately recommended that
the charges against MacDonald be dismissed.1 9 The Army dismissed the
charges against MacDonald and, like Pantano, MacDonald was honorably
discharged from the service.22 0 He was living happily as a civilian when
four years later the DOJ initiated a prosecution of him after several years
212 Id. at § 3292.
213 Id. at § 244i(c)(i). See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 5o, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3114,
75 U.N.TS. 31. See also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 51, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.TS. 287; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 13o, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T
3316,75 U.N.TS. 135.
214 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a) (2oo6).
215 Id. at§ 3281.
216 JOE McGINNIss, FATAL VISION (1983).
217 Id. at 20-24.
218 Id. at 185.
2I9 Id. at 188-209.
220 Id. at 209, 234.
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of lobbying by the family of his deceased wife."2 ' Eventually, after several
appeals, MacDonald was tried and convicted of the murders in U.S. District
Court in Raleigh, North Carolina in 1979.22 As a result of that conviction,
MacDonald was sentenced to three consecutive life terms and remains in
federal prison to this day."23 This case illustrates perfectly the non-binding
nature of the military decision when federal criminal jurisdiction otherwise
exists-and why Pantano should not rest too easy.
Critics of the proposal may argue that creating a Comriission to "second-
guess" military commanders' decisions undermines their authority and
is detrimental to their autonomy. Although there is some merit in this
argument, I ultimately find it unpersuasive in light of the poor record by
military authorities on these issues over the past ten years. In my opinion,
the outcome of cases like Haditha, the Stryker Brigade Kill Team, and
Pantano make the necessity for an independent review very apparent. If
the evidence indicated that U.S. commanders were diligently investigating
and pursuing charges in cases where credible evidence exists, then there
would be no necessity for the creation of the Commission. Unfortunately,
that is not the case.
Critics may also suggest that having the U.S. join the ICC would solve
many of the problems raised in this article. Under the Rome Statute,
2 4
when a nation who is party to the Convention is "unwilling or unable"
to investigate or prosecute war crimes, the ICC has jurisdiction.2 5 The
U.S. has long opposed joining the ICC for several reasons, chief among
them the concern that politically motivated prosecutions will be mounted
against U.S. service members.11
6
Over the past year and a half, the Obama Administration has initiated a
policy of re-engagement in the ICC process that is a remarkable turnaround
from the outright hostility with which the Bush Administration approached
the ICC. 2 7 Notwithstanding this reversal of course, it is unlikely that the
U.S. will soon ratify the Rome Statute because significant questions remain
as to its compatibility with the U.S. Constitution and whether there is
sufficient due process in the ICC procedures.2 '
221 Id. at 293-3 10.
222 See generally id. at 475-585.
223 Id. at 585.
224 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.TS. 3, 3
I.L.M. 999, available at http://www.icc-cpi.intlNR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-575z-4F84-BE94-
oA65 5 EB3oE i6/o/RomeStatuteEnglish.pdf (establishing and governing the ICC).
225 Id. at art. 170)(a).
226 ELSEA, supra note 7o, at 7; Edith M. Lederer, US Supports War Crimes Tribunal for
First Time, WASH. PosT, Mar. 2, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2o 1103/02/AR2oI I030203266.html.
227 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 71.
228 ELSEA, supra note 70, at 5-9.
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I support the view of those who caution against U.S. participation in the
ICC. The concerns presented by those who oppose U.S. acquiescence is
persuasive, especially concerns that the ICC subjects U.S. service members
to unnecessary risk of politically motivated prosecutions. However, this
conclusion only reinforces the view that internal U.S. mechanisms for
prosecuting war crimes need to be strengthened immediately.
Finally, it seems that any argument that suggests allowing the nation(s)
on whose soil the crimes are committed to have jurisdiction is also
unpersuasive. In countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, where the rule of law
is slowly being established, the criminal justice systems are not mature
and subjecting U.S. personnel to their jurisdiction would be unwise for the
foreseeable future.
CONCLUSION
In the years since 9/11 the U.S. has engaged in long wars in both Iraq
and Afghanistan. During the course of those wars, many situations have
occurred involving U.S. forces that have raised questions as to whether
U.S. personnel have committed war crimes. The evidence suggests that
the U.S. effort to ensure internal accountability for war crimes has been
anemic. In light of the importance of international respect for the Geneva
Conventions to our own forces, the U.S. must take immediate steps to
strengthen the process for investigation and :prosecution of war crimes.
Moreover, U.S. credibility in the international community on war crimes
issues has been diminished and must be restored. This article recommends
the creation of a joint Department of Defense and Department of Justice
War Crimes Review Commission to enhance future U.S. efforts in war
crimes enforcement. In addition, egregious cases like. Haditha, Kill Team,
and Pantano cry out for remediation and justice. The proposal in this article
is not a cure-all but simply a first step toward more just and comprehensive
accountability for war crimes.
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APPENDIX I: SAMPLE OF CASES WITH QUESTIONABLE HANDLING OF WAR
CRIMES PROSECUTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES
The information in this appendix related to incidents reported between
2001-2005 is from appendix 2 of an article written by Major Mynda G.
Ohman. 2 9 Incidents reported between late 2005-2011 were obtained from
open source records, mainly newspaper articles.
Sergeant Selena M. Salcedo was tried on charges of assaulting an
Afghan detainee, dereliction of duty, and lying to investigators. 3 ° A former
interrogator at Bagram, Afghanistan, Sergeant Salcedo is suspected of
stepping on the detainee's bare foot, grabbing his beard, kicking him,
and then ordering the detainee to remain chained to the ceiling.2 3' The
detainee later died of heart failure caused by "blunt force injuries" to his
lower legs 32 At trial, Sergeant Salcedo pled guilty and received a sentence
of a one-grade reduction in rank, $1000 fine, and a written reprimand.
33
Sergeant First Class Tracy Perkins was court-martialed in January 2005
for forcing two Iraqis to jump from a bridge into the Tigris River in January
2004 and for the resulting death of one of the men.2 4 He was convicted
of obstruction of justice, assault consummated by a battery, and two
specifications of aggravated assault, but he was acquitted of involuntary
manslaughter and making a false official statement.23 - The sentence
included six months of confinement and a one-grade reduction to the rank
of staff sergeant.2 36 Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Sassaman received non-
judicial punishment for ordering the cover-up of the death.
37
Major Jessica Voss, who headed the 66th Military Intelligence Unit,
received a reprimand following the November 2003 death of an Iraqi
general at the hands of U.S. soldiers under her supervision.23 Chief Warrant
Officer Lewis Welshofer Jr. was charged with murder and dereliction of
229 Mynda G. Ohman, Integrating Title 18 War Crimes into Title Io: A Proposal to Amend the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 57 A.E L. REV. i, app. 2 (2005).
230 Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates' Deaths, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 2005, at AI.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Tim Golden, Abuse Cases Open Command Issues at Army Prison, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8,
2005, at AI.
234 Suzanne Goldenberg, US to Try zo More Troops for Iraq Abuse, GUARDIAN (Jan. 16,
2005), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2oo5/jan/I7/iraq.usa.
235 GI Sentencedto Six Months in Iraq Drowning Case, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 9, 2005, at i8.
236 Goldenberg, supra note 234; John W. Gonzalez, 5 More Who Served in Iraq Have Fort
Hood Court Dates, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 16, 2005, at A6.
237 Army Punishes Commanders in Drowning of Iraqi Civilian, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 8,
2004, at A5 .
238 Arthur Kane, Witness Says Brass Complicit in Abuse, DENVER POsT, Mar. 31, 2005, at Ao.
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duty relating to the suffocation of the Iraqi general. 39 He was accused of
sitting on the general's chest while the man was bound and covered in
a sleeping bag. 4° Chief Warrant Officer Welshofer was convicted on the
lesser charge of negligent homicide and was sentenced to a reprimand,
forfeiture of $6,000 in pay, and restriction to Fort Carson or his place of
worship for two months.
41
Corporal Dustin Berg faced charges of murder, false swearing, and
wearing of an unauthorized award 4 after Army officials reported that
Corporal Berg had shot himself and killed a civilian member of the Iraqi
police with whom he had been on patrol in November 2003.43 Corporal
Berg received a Purple Heart for combat injuries that he may have
sustained from that incident. 44 Testimony at the preliminary hearing in
February 2005 suggested that Corporal Berg shot himself in the abdomen
with the Iraqi's weapon after he shot the Iraqi police officer. 45 Under a plea
agreement, Corporal Berg pled guilty in July 2005 to negligent homicide,
self-injury, and making two false official statements.2 46 Although a military
judge sentenced him to six years of confinement and bad-conduct
discharge, the terms of the plea agreement limited his confinement to
eighteen months.
47
Private First Class Edward L. Richmond Jr. was charged with shooting
an Iraqi handcuffed arrestee in the head during a roundup of suspected
insurgents on February 28, 2004.41 At trial, Private First Class Richmond
testified that he fired after he thought the man lunged at another solider
and said that he did not know the man's hands were secured.2 49 Convicted
239 January3o Election Won't Be Delayed, Bush Says, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 3, 2004,
at 2A.
24o Erin Emery & Dave Curtin, Iraqi's Kin Calls Gr Penalty Too Light, DENVER POST, Jan.
25, 2006, at AoI.
241 Id.
242 Jon Murray, Hoosier Faces Trial in Killing of Iraqi, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 9, 2005, at
AI.
243 Michael Lindenberger, Guardsman Is Charged with Murder Lying About Incident that
Led to Award, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, KY), Feb. 9, 2005, at B3.
244 Id.
245 Terry Horne, Indiana Soldier to Be Tried in Death of Iraqi Policeman, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Mar. 5, 2005, at A8.
246 Jon Murray, Berg Pleads Guilty to Lesser Charge in Iraqi Killing, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July
26, 2005, at A5.
247 Id.
248 Jason Chudy, GI Faces Court-Martial in Death of Suspected Insurgent, STARS & STRIPES
(Aug. I, 2004), http://www.stripes.com/news/gi-faces-court-martial-in-death-of-suspected-
insurgent-I .22316.
249 Iraq Digest: U.S. Soldier Convicted in Death of Cowherd, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 8, 2004,
at A7.
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of voluntary manslaughter, the soldier was sentenced to three years of
confinement and a dishonorable discharge."' 0
Master Sergeant Trey Corrales was charged with murder after allegedly
shooting an Iraqi man and placing an interpreter's rifle on the man during a
raid in Kirkuk."' l Allegedly, he then ordered Specialist Christopher P. Shore
to finish off the wounded Iraqi."'2 Multiple soldiers offered testimony in an
evidentiary hearing for Shore months before the trial for Corrales began. 53
It was testified that Corrales "left no question through his actions that he
intended to kill a 'bad guy' whether he was a combatant or not.''54 Shore cut
a plea bargain and testified against Corrales at trial. A jury of war veterans
acquitted Corrales, and Shore was granted clemency after the verdict and
remains in the Army.55
A Marine was convicted of assault for throwing a lighted match at a
detainee as the detainee used an alcohol-based hand sanitizer; the Iraqi
suffered second-degree burns on his hands and the Marine was sentenced
to confinement for ninety days.
56
Sergeant First Class Jorge L. Diaz was arraigned in February 2005 on
charges of premeditated murder, maltreatment of a prisoner, assault, making
a false official statement, and impeding an investigation. 57 During a search
operation in October 2004, SFC Diaz punched and choked a blindfolded,
teenaged Iraqi detainee, pointed a pistol at his head, and forced him to hold
a smoke grenade with the pin pulled. 5 The next day, SFC Diaz fatally
shot an Iraqi who had his hands cuffed.259 He allegedly told a soldier to
lie about the incident and falsely told an Army investigator that he fired
at the Iraqi after the man had made a threatening move toward him. 60 At
trial, after hearing testimony from SFC Diaz, the military judge found him
guilty of unpremeditated murder. 61 He was also convicted of maltreating
250 Id.
251 Sig Christenson, Trial Now Past, GI Looks Ahead With No Regrets. SAN ANTONIO
EXPREss-NEws, Sept. 14, 2oo9, at oIA.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Gail Gibson, Marines AbusedDetainees in Iraq, Documents Show-Penalties Mostly Lighter
Than in Abu Ghraib Case, BALT. SUN, Dec. 15, 2004, at IA.
257 Steve Liewer, Ist ID Soldier Charged with Killing One Iraqi Prisoner Mistreating Others,
STARS & STRIPES (Feb. 26, 2005), http://www.stripes.com/news/ist-id-soldier-charged-with-
killing-one-iraqi-prisoner-mistreating-others-I .2993 I.
258 Id.
259 Id.
26o Id.
261 Steve Liewer, ist ID Soldier Found Guilty in Shooting Death of Iraqi, STARS & STRIPES
(May 19, 2oo5), http://www.stripes.com/news/Ist-id-soldier-found-guilty-in-shooting-
death-of-iraqi-1 .33490.
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the Iraqi teen and impeding the investigation but acquitted of the charge
of making a false statement. 6 The military judge imposed a sentence that
included a dishonorable discharge, reduction to the rank of E-1, and eight
years of confinement, which was reduced to seven years through a plea
agreement163
Specialist Brent W. May, along with co-accused Sergeant Michael P.
Williams, is accused of fatally shooting an Iraqi man in his home during
house-to-house searches on August 28, 2004, and attempting to cover up
the crime."6 After soldiers found a revolver and AK-47 in the man's house,
Sergeant Williams brought the Iraqi and Specialist May inside while the
man's family remained outside.2 61 Staff Sergeant Williams allegedly told
Specialist May, "You know what to do," to which SPC May replied by asking
excitedly, "Can I shoot this one?"; after this brief exchange, Specialist May
shot the man twice in the head.166 Specialist May claimed that Sergeant
Williams ordered him to shoot the Iraqi.167 At trial, he was convicted of
unpremeditated murder and sentenced to five years of confinement and a
dishonorable discharge.1
68
Sergeant Leonardo Trevino was charged with premeditated murder,
attempted murder, solicitation to commit murder and three counts of
obstruction of justice after he killed a badly wounded Al Qaeda operative
in Muqdadiyah, Iraq. 69 Prosecutors alleged that he killed the insurgent
while the man was no longer a threat, while Sergeant Trevino maintained
that he thought the insurgent was reaching for a weapon when he fired
the fatal shots. 70 On May 1, 2008, a military jury found him not guilty
of all charges.2 7 ' In March earlier that year, Specialist John Torres, the
Army medic accused of trying to suffocate the insurgent before Sergeant
Trevino's final shots, was acquitted of attempted premeditated murder and
dereliction of duty for failing to provide aid.272 In another trial in March
2008, Corporal Justin Whiteman, accused of placing the pistol by the
262 Id.
263 Steve Liewer, ist ID Soldier Gets Seven Years in Killing of Iraqi Detainee, STARS &
STRIPES (May 20, 2005), http://www.stripes.com/news/ist-id-soldier-gets-seven-years-in-
killing-of-iraqi-detainee-1 .33552.
264 Edmund Sanders, Troops' Murder Cases in Iraq Detailed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2004, at I.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Monica Davey, An Iraqi Police Officer' Death, A Soldier's Varying Accounts, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, zoos, at AI, AI4.
269 Soldier Acquitted In Death Of Iraqi, CBSNEwS (Feb. I I, 2oo9),http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2oo8/o5/o i/national/main4o63969.shtml.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id.
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insurgent's body, was acquitted of accessory to attempted premeditated
murder and of dereliction of duty.
273
Specialist Glendale C. Walls II was charged in early May 2005 with
assault, maltreatment of a detainee, and failure to obey a lawful order.
74
The charges stemmed from allegations of using abusive interrogation
techniques at Bagram, Afghanistan. 75 One of the detainees interrogated by
Specialist Walls in December 2002 died a short time later at the detention
facility27 6 At trial in August 2005, Specialist Walls admitted to abusing the
detainee and was sentenced to a demotion to the ranking of private, two
months of confinement, and a bad-conduct discharge.
77
Private First Class Willie Brand was also charged with offenses related
to a December 10, 2002, death of a detainee at Bagram, Afghanistan.
2 8
PFC Brand was charged with involuntary manslaughter, aggravated
assault, simple assault, maiming, maltreatment, and making a false sworn
statement. 7 Following his conviction on all the charges except for
involuntary manslaughter, the reservist was reduced to the lowest enlisted
rank.
81
Lieutenant Colonel Allen B. West, the most senior American officer
to be charged with direct prisoner abuse,2  faced potential charges of
excessive use of force against an Iraqi in August 2003.12 Lieutenant
Colonel West led an uncooperative detainee, an Iraqi policeman suspected
of planning attacks against U.S. forces, outside to an area used for cleaning
weapons, gave the man a count to five to start cooperating, then fired two
shots near the detainee.283 He also allowed soldiers from his unit to beat the
detainee .21 Lieutenant Colonel West was relieved of his command and,
after a pretrial hearing under Article 32 of the UCMJ, the commanding
general disposed of the charges through nonjudicial punishment instead of
referring them to trial by court-martial. 85
273 Id.
274 Golden, supra note 230.
275 See id.
276 Id.
277 GIBusted, Jailed in Prisoner Abuse, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 24, 2005, at 1o.
278 Douglas Jehl, Army Details Scale of Abuse in Afghan Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2005, at
AI; Nation in Brief, WASH. PosT, Mar. 8, 2005, at Ai6.
279 Id.
280 U.S. Digest, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Aug. 19, 2005, atA9.
281 Richard Beeston, US Officer Admits Role in Mock Execution, TIMES (London), Nov. 20,
2003, at 22.
282 Report: West Will Not Face Court-Martial, STARS & STRIPES (Dec. 14, 2003), www.
stripes.com/news/report-west-will-not-face-court-martial-i. 14475.
283 Id.
284 Beeston,supra note 281, at 22.
285 Report: West Will Not Face Court-Martial, supra note 282.
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Marine SergeantJermaine Nelson pled guilty to two charges ofdereliction
of duty for his part in the execution-style slaying of a detainee during the
November 2004 battle of Fallujah, Iraq.116 Nelson and two other Marines,
Sergeant Jose Nazario and Sergeant Ryan Weemer, captured four men in a
house containing weapons and asked their platoon leader for guidance 87
Interpreting the response of "Are they dead yet?" as a command to kill
the captives, the marines shot the captives and moved on. 8' Prosecutors
dropped a charge of murder in exchange for the plea. 89 In September 2009,
Nelson was sentenced to 150 days suspended confinement and reduction
in rank to lance corporal.9 0 Nazario was acquitted by a civilian jury in
Federal District Court, and Weemer was found not guilty by a court-martial
panel.!9' Because the three refused to testify against one another and the
house and bodies were demolished during battle, the prosecution had little
evidence other than Weemer's statement years later during a Secret Service
application interview.
292
Lance Corporal Christian Hernandez faced charges of negligent
homicide and assault after a fifty-two-year-old Ba'ath Party member died
in June 2003 at Camp Whitehorse near Nasiriyah, Iraq. 9 3 Charges were
dropped without comment in April 2004.94 Major Clarke Paulus was also
charged in the case. He was originally charged with negligent homicide
of the detainee, who had been handcuffed, beaten, and left for hours in
the sun despite experiencing difficulty in breathing and diarrhea.2 95 One
of eight Marines facing charges in the detainee's death, 96 Major Paulus
was acquitted of assault and battery but found guilty of dereliction of
duty and of maltreatment of prisoners for not stopping the abuse by his
286 Steve Liewer, Marine Gets Loss of Rank in Shooting, SAN DIEGO UNION-TIB., Oct. i,
2oo9, at B I.
287 Id.
z88 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Rick Rogers, Marine's Trial Begins in '04 Slaying in Iraq, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., Apr.
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subordinates.297 He was punished with dismissal from the Marine Corps,
which is the officer's equivalent of a dishonorable discharge.
9 8
Specialist Brian E. Cammack was charged with assault and other crimes
related to the abuse and death of two detainees at Bagram, Afghanistan."9 In
May of 2005, SPC Cammack pleaded guilty to assault and two specifications
of making a false official statement and agreed to testify in related cases.
30 0
He was sentenced to three months of confinement, reduction to E-1, and
a bad-conduct discharge.
30 1
Lance Corporal Delano Holmes was charged with murder after stabbing
to death an Iraqi Army soldier with whom he was standing a night watch
during an escalating scuffle that began when Holmes knocked away the
Iraqi's lit cigarette to avoid attracting sniper fire.302 In December 2007,
a court-martial panel found Holmes guilty of "negligent homicide and
providing a false official statement to investigators" and sentenced him to
a bad conduct discharge but no confinement.3 3
Captain Carl Bjork was charged with murder after an Iraqi police chief,
Ibrahim Hamid Jaza, committed a revenge killing of two men and claimed
he had been ordered to kill them by his training officer, Captain Bjork.3 °4
In May 2010, a court-martial panel in Iraq acquitted Bjork of murder but
convicted him of "two counts of negligence in those deaths, plus reckless
endangerment for setting a booby trap of a weapons cache." Bjork was
sentenced to a reprimand and the loss of one-third of his salary for one
year.
305
A U.S. Marine Corps Court of Inquiry "investigated allegations that as
many as nineteen Afghan civilians died when a unit of... Marines special
operations troops opened fire after a car bomb targeted their convoy"
in March 2007 in Nangahar Province, Afghanistan.30 6 The incident was
described as follows:
Citing witness accounts, Afghanistan's Independent Human
Rights Commission concluded the Marines fired indiscriminately
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at vehicles and pedestrians in six different locations on a 10-
mile stretch of road. But nearly a dozen Marines, who told the
court they heard gunfire after the bombing, called the unit's fire
a disciplined response to a well-planned ambush.
3
1
7
After reviewing the Court of Inquiry's findings, Lieutenant General
Samuel Helland, the commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central
Command, decided not to bring charges against Major Fred C. Galvin and
Captain Vincent J. Noble."'
307 Id.
308 Id.
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